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Kosovo's Rugova Praises Visits to U.S., Germany

AU2012162495 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 20 Dec 95

[Announcer-read report, including interview with Ibrahim Rugova, "president of the Republic of Kosova," by Asllan Bajrami in Tirana on 20 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] After several-day visits to Washington and Bonn, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, arrived in Tirana today. At Rinas airport, Rugova gave an interview for the radio-television on his meetings with U.S. Secretary of State Christopher and German Foreign Minister Kinkel.

[Bajrami] Mr. President, during your stay in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, you held meetings with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. During these visits, you also held a series of other meetings with top officials of these two countries. What is your assessment of these visits?

[Rugova] It was a very important visit in the framework of regular relations to establish friendly and better ties between the United States and, of course, Kosova. As you have been informed, U.S. Secretary of State Christopher assured us that after Dayton, Kosova will be on top of the international agenda in the Balkans. I am very pleased with the visit I had there and also the meetings I held with Mr. Anthony Lake, other U.S. officials, and U.S. Congress members.

The visit to Germany was a very friendly visit, as was the meeting with German Foreign Minister Kinkel. Kinkel assured us that the Kosova issue will be at the top of the lists of the international agenda and that Germany and the European Union countries will be committed to resolving the Kosova issue. Of course, the Kosova issue will be regulated within the framework of a solution based on the political will of the Kosova people.

The visit to Germany was also carried out in the framework of regular and friendly relations with this European country.

Germany Signs Financial Aid Agreement for Reforms

LD1912174995 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 1600 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—The German Government will continue to provide financial support for the reforms in Albania. Development Aid Minister Carl-Dieter Spranger and Albanian President Sali Berisha signed in Bonn today a project agreement worth 47 million German marks [DM]. This means that since 1987 the German Government has granted Albania a total of DM304 million, to be used mainly for water supply and agricultural projects.

Spranger expressed "appreciation and respect" for the reforms in the formerly communist country. The minister encouraged Berisha to continue the policy of reform. The Albanian president said that cooperation with Germany is making a substantial contribution to the implementation and consolidation of political and economic reform in his country. [passage omitted]

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French Minister Interviewed on EU Expansion

AU2112115495 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 18 Dec 95 p 3

[Interview with Michel Barnier, French minister for European affairs, by Panteley Karasimeonov in Sofia; date not given: "Bulgaria Is an Example of Stability in Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Karasimeonov] Minister, why did you come to Sofia and what do you expect from the visit?

[Barnier] Bulgaria is among the Central and East European states that are associated with the EU and are preparing for full membership of the EU. It has already submitted its application, and we welcome this. We must prepare your entry to the EU together. Bulgaria wants to become acquainted with the French positions on the main issues of European reconstruction, and more specifically, on the intergovernmental conference on reforming the institutions and on economic and monetary union We are prepared to talk.

We are aware of Bulgaria's strategic importance. It is a state that has succeeded in implementing a political and economic transition in your unstable region without any shocks. It has preserved stability inside the country and in the region, while striving to preserve good neighborly relations with the surrounding states. We have a high regard for this. [passage omitted]

[Karasimeonov] What is the French position on expanding the EU eastward, and what new ideas does it intend to present at the intergovernmental conference of the 15?

[Barnier] At the personal request of President Chirac, I began a series of visits in the Central and East European states in order to discuss with their leaders the manner of the union's future expansion. I want to specifically ascertain the assistance that the EU, and more specifically, France, could render to facilitate the expansion of the community. [passage omitted]

[Karasimeonov] The opinion prevails that Europe failed to prevent the expansion of the Yugoslav conflict, because it was not united on the issue. Do you think that the 15 will draw the necessary conclusions and will show willingness to conduct a united foreign and defense policy in the future?

[Barnier] It is not just to talk about a failure as you do. It is true that expectations were rather high when a fundamental evolution in the EU construction began. The EU failed to fully justify all the hopes and expectations, but one cannot deny Europe's fundamental role in resolving the conflict, and facilitating the upcoming humanitarian activity. Europe has provided more than 60 percent of the humanitarian aid for the nations of former Yugoslavia. I could summarize the situation in the following manner: The conflict in former Yugoslavia confirmed the need to expand the EU's role in the continent. The conflict demonstrated that the EU is capable of mobilizing significant forces and meeting the challenge. One cannot avoid the conclusion, however, that there is a certain discrepancy between the decisionmaking mechanisms and the challenges that emerged. The conflict also showed that the EU countries lack a common will on certain problems. [passage omitted]

Konakchiev, FRY Minister Assess Relations

LD2012203895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1935 GMT 20 Dec 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, Dec 20 (TANJUG)—Bulgarian Vice-Premier Doncho Konakchiev and Yugoslav Transport Minister Zoran Vujovic assessed here Wednesday [20 December] that the field of transport accounted for the best form of economic cooperation between the two countries, affording the big chance of a quicker integration of the entire Balkans into Europe.

Konakchiev and Vujovic assessed that the suspension of sanctions against Yugoslavia and the signing of the Bosnia peace agreement had opened ample possibilities of developing economic bonds between Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Vujovic had a talk also with Bulgarian Transport Minister Stamen Stamenov. They assessed that the two countries' historical chance was to use right now their geopolitical location to modernize their railways, telecommunications and roads along the major trunk direction between the Middle East and the West via the Balkans.

They also discussed the electrification of the international railway line connecting Sofia and Nis, the city in Serbia's south, and the modernization of the Sofia-Nis road.

Zhelev Returns From 'Beneficial' Visit to Portugal

AU2112081695 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0500 GMT 21 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] I think that my visit has been beneficial for the future political and trade-economic relations between Bulgaria and Portugal, President Zhelev said upon arrival in Sofia from Portugal late last night. As is well known, he had made an official three-day visit to Portugal at the invitation of Portuguese President Mario Soares.

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Portugal will support Bulgaria's efforts to join the EU. This follows the official submission of Bulgaria's application to join the EU at the EU Madrid summit a few days ago. This was the most important aspect of the meetings that President Zhelev and the Bulgarian delegation conducted in Lisbon with Mr. Soares, Prime Minister Antonio Guterres, and other politicians and statesmen.

Defense Ministers Sign Cooperation Accord

AU2112103995 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 21 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 21 December, Belarusian Defense Minister Leanid Maltsaw arrived in Bulgaria. After the greeting ceremony, a 45-minute meeting with Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov took place.

Issues related to the two countries' armed forces and the reforms being implemented were discussed.

The two ministers signed an agreement on military cooperation.

Former BSP Leaders' 'Comeback' Considered

AU2012151695 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 15 Dec 95 p 10

[Article by Rosen Kutelov: "The Old Lions Are Making a Comeback in the BSP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] All the interesting political developments next year will be connected with the internal processes inside the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. Having won the local elections, in practical terms it now has no opponent whom it has to take into consideration. Free of such pressure, the party can now allocate time and resources to examine its own problems, and for at least two reasons. First, to seek a pragmatic model that will enable it to remain in power as long as possible, and second, to decide which of the centers of influence within the party is to dominate while the BSP remains the ruling force.

The Videnov cabinet's 10 months in office are quite long enough for us to see what the young party chairman is capable of and what he is not. His skill in controlling the levers of executive power will determine how long the party will be able to hang on to power before its disillusioned electors force it into opposition. However well disciplined the BSP is as a whole, and however well its leaders succeed in concealing their dissatisfaction with each other, nevertheless, to ensure that the party remains in government for a long period (and to ensure their own survival at the top), they will not hesitate to express their dissatisfaction, even with the party leader, if they consider that he endangers the party's well-being in any way.

At the same time, there is one problem that represents a potential booby trap for the largest political force, namely, the question of what kind of party the BSP is. Last summer, this question hung like the sword of Damocles over BSP headquarters, and only the party's perfect bureaucratic schooling and the approaching local elections diverted the agitated electorate from this fateful issue. When the question of who is who in the BSP is clarified, this will help the party avert upheavals at a most inconvenient time. Perhaps for this very reason, only now has a party authority declared that only the BSP can bring a right-wing party into existence in Bulgaria.

On the question of authorities, the activity of the most influential personalities in the BSP undoubtedly provides the clearest signal that a process of crystallizing of positions and directions is under way within the party. The BSP's 100-year-long history shows that as long as one of the former leaders remains in the party, one cannot exclude the possibility that he may reemerge in the forefront. Many Red leaders in different latitudes and longitudes have demonstrated this knack, such as Deng Xiaoping, for example. Although many may think that the constant bandying of the names of Andrey Lukanov and Aleksandur Lilov is nothing but harking back to a forgotten past, there are clearly sound reasons for this. One only has to look at Lilov's activities in the short month that has elapsed since the local elections.

Two parliamentary facts are sufficient to indicate that the Strategist [reference to Lilov, as director of the BSP Institute of Strategic Studies] is strengthening his positions. At the end of November, at the proposal of the BSP majority in the Parliamentary Economic Commission, the Supervisory Board of the Privatization Agency was supposed to be reduced from 11 to seven members. The Democratic Left Parliamentary Group rejected this idea, not because of the views of the group's eminent economists or its members with rich business experience, but because of the view held by none other than.... Aleksandur Lilov. Some suggest that the reduction of the Supervisory Board's membership was designed to allow the cabinet to exert more influence on it. The decision that was adopted following Lilov's speech looks like a well-concealed blow against the government—a light, warning slap of the kind that an experienced teacher administers.

A few days later, the Democratic Left's bill on the state coat of arms was stalled, again following Lilov's intervention, on the grounds that one half of the people cannot impose something of nationwide importance on

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the other half. This again contains elements of a warning to the cabinet, pointing out that it has isolated itself and is not managing to think in all-national terms.

If all these are symptoms of the corrective role of the experienced BSP leaders of the older generation, then this raises two questions: whether Lilov's younger supporters in the central party leadership will manage to put their political line into effect, and whether "technocrats" like Lukanov will find a common language with "ideologists" of Lilov's ilk. Many people are already inclined to answer both questions in the affirmative. Recently, Krasimir Premyanov [leader of Democratic Left Parliamentary Group] was asked if the old lion Lilov is not making a comeback. The representative of the younger generation of BSP leaders widened the field of speculation by retorting that old lions are not dangerous, even when there are many of them, adding that the BSP should be pleased that it has so many fearless leaders. However, old hunters will recall that the jungles are full of the bones of overconfident hunters who encountered a solitary big predator.

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IFOR Unit Lacks Drivers, Other Specialists

AU2012213195 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 16 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by "(abi)": "The Czech IFOR Unit Lacks Drivers and Other Specialists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Cesky Krumlov — The Czech unit that from mid-January is to operate within the IFOR multinational forces overseeing adherence to the Bosnian peace agreements needs about 50 drivers. The inspector of the Army's ground forces, General Karel Kuba, said that almost half of the roughly 1,200 men who originally applied to serve in the IFOR mission did not pass the tests or were unsuitable for health reasons. "Apart from drivers, we also have a shortage of technicians, communications operators, and doctors," said Kuba.

Defense Minister Vilem Holan, who yesterday visited the training base for the UN peacekeeping forces in Vysne near Cesky Krumlov, emphasized that the deployment of the Czech battalion is viewed as a peacekeeping operation. About 80 percent of it consists of getting the troops ready. "The unit is equipped with more hardware and has been given a tougher mandate, first and foremost, so that the troops can defend themselves, orient themselves in minefields, or provide first aid," said Holan.

Holan considers the financial bonus of $1,500 per month that the soldiers will receive for serving in Bosnia, to be commensurate with the difficulties they will face.

The basis for the unit is the rapid deployment brigade, bolstered by 200 troops who had been prepared for deployment in Croatia, but eventually were not dispatched there. Two hundred soldiers who have already been in Croatia will also go to Bosnia. About one-third of the unit will be made up of career soldiers; the rest will be volunteers from the reserves. A total of 800 men are involved; so far, 650 of them have undergone training. As of 2 January, the entire IFOR unit will go through team-building exercises in Boletice — including combat firing exercises — and in mid January the first 200 soldiers should fly to Bosnia.

An eight-member team of military experts departed yesterday. They are heading for the town of Gornji Vakuf, where the IFOR British sector's headquarters — within which the Czech contingent should operate — are to be based. Here, the Czech officers will specify the tasks that await the troops.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Transport to Dukovany Resumes

AU2012183595 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 19 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by "(bar)": "CEZ Has Resumed Transporting Nuclear Waste to the Dukovany Power Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague — The CEZ [Czech Power Plants] company has resumed after a three-month break the transportation of spent fuel from the Slovak nuclear power plant in Jaslovske Bohunice to the Dukovany power plant in South Moravia. The three-month stoppage was necessary due to the modification of the Slovak intermediate storage facility.

So far, three special trains with highly radioactive material have arrived in Dukovany. CEZ spokesman Michal Kacena said that all of them arrived from Jaslovske Bohunice without any problems. The consignments are accompanied by extraordinary security measures, in which the Security Information Service is also involved.

The spent fuel now being transported to South Moravia was in fact produced by the Dukovany power plant. The waste was originally supposed to have ended up in the Soviet Union; it, however, later refused to accept the radioactive material. Slovakia then demanded that the spent fuel be returned to the Dukovany plant. The transportation of the spent fuel from Slovakia to Moravia should be completed in 1997.

Industrial Output Increasing Despite Problems

95CH0369F Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 12 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by ri: "The Industrial Enterprises Are Getting Their Second Wind"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the first few months of this year, in comparison with the same period of last year, our industry has recorded a certain recovery. This is evident from the data processed by the Association for Industry and Transportation of the Czech Republic. This organization is the one to which the majority of industrial enterprises addresses their problems, suggestions, and specific intentions; it happens to be the largest employer association that represents a substantial portion of our industry and our transportation. Today, its membership base is made up of 27 collective and 145 individual members that come together on the basis of their economic branch membership, on the basis of the membership of their specialties, or on the basis of their region. Expressed in concrete figures, the organization represents approximately 1,200 enterprises employing more than 1 million workers. Its direct

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partners in the negotiation of legislative and conceptual questions are five ministries; the organization participates in tripartite negotiations and develops contacts with foreign countries; it is a member of the International Association of Industrial and Employer Associations of Europe (UNICE); in 1992, it renewed its membership in the International Organization of Employers. Its representatives participate in the work done by permanent commissions for economic collaboration of the OECD, the European Union, and the Executive Committee of EFTA [European Free Trade Association]. It is the carrier of UNDP [United Nations Development Program] and UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] programs, which support the development of contacts and foreign investments for Czech enterprises. Incidentally, within the framework of this program, partners for projects with a total value of $7.5 million were successfully found.

Greater Production Dynamic

This year, according to Pavel Dzida, deputy director of the Association for Industry and Transportation of the Czech Republic, should be better than last year. In the first quarter, industrial production, in comparable prices, increased by 5.8 percent in comparison with the same period of last year. On the basis of this result, and while maintaining the same pace of production, prerequisites exist for the overall volume of production this year to reach a level of approximately 994,240 million korunas [Kc] in current prices, which represents an 11-percent increase over last year.

The structure of industrial organizations has changed expressly. The majority of enterprises are already in private ownership. Of course, from the standpoint of production volume and employment, these companies are in second place—behind state enterprises. A comparison of the share in production in view of employment is provided by an indicator that has always been a kind of Achilles' heel in our economy—labor productivity. Internal analyses, conducted by the Association for Industry and Transportation, indicate that the highest productivity occurs in enterprises with foreign participation, with companies created jointly by ourselves and by foreign partners. These companies account for 10.6 percent of the total volume of industrial production and 6.2 percent of total employment. They also pay the highest monthly average wages.

A positive ratio between the volume of production and employment also exists in the category of the largest enterprises, which account for 26.7 percent of total production with 17.7 percent of total employment, and in the group of organizations employing between 500 and 999 workers, which account for 18.6 percent of the total volume of production. With respect to all other groups, the relationship between the share in the volume of production and employment is the opposite.

Obligations and Claims

One of the exacerbating problems that accompany the activities of the majority of firms that are active in any branch of industry is indebtedness. Primary or possibly secondary insolvency represent burdens that are capable of pulling even a seasoned enterprise to the ground. The balances from last year indicate that the greatest rise occurred in the volume of obligations in transport—an increase of 36.5 percent. Second place on this ladder is occupied by an increase of 24 percent in the production and distribution of energy. On the other hand, obligations declined in the area of the coking industry, in the refinery area, and in the area of nuclear fuels—by 37 percent.

An opposite development occurred with respect to claims and obligations that had missed the installment deadline. The volume of claims in this case definitely exceeds the volume of obligations. Judged on the basis of the difference between the starting and ending status of last year, industry saw an increase in claims by 11 percent (in the paper industry, it exceeded 50 percent), in the construction industry by 34 percent, whereas this figure declined in transportation by 23 percent.

One of the possibilities for resolving the situation involves exports. Foreign customers generally pay on time and, moreover, many firms are interested in capital participation or technological participation in the modernization and restructuring of our industry. Recently, however, the pace of exports is declining. In 1994, industry accounted for Kc279,082 million of the total volume of exports, valued at Kc411,457 million, and managed to preserve its position. Nevertheless, this branch of industry is showing some negative factors. These primarily involve the efficiency of exports, which is not achieving optimum levels for the time being.

Missed Opportunities

The problems that are beginning to show up with respect to the export of our products have several causes. They are a reflection of the lack of clarity in the process of structural changes and internal development, hesitation, and occasionally even laxness with respect to the burgeoning negative phenomena. It is precisely in exports that we have missed many opportunities to acquire foreign orders in conjunction with the delays surrounding the establishment of the Export Bank and the contemplations regarding the design of the state proexport policy. In the opinion of Pavel Dzida, indecisiveness is

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one of the reasons we are losing opportunities to participate in foreign tenders. The largest bank in Brazil came with an offer to share in the financing of projects undertaken by our firms. A similar opportunity in southeast Asia is also opening up through a Manila banking house that finances virtually all tenders and provides the overwhelming portion of credits in this region. This is a matter of annual investments amounting to several billion, but here the state must act as a partner and give guarantees. A promising market could open up in Albania. That country is allegedly showing eminent interest in collaborating with our enterprises and, as P. Dzida stressed, has the means to pay. However, from our side, an adequate reaction to these signals is lacking for the time being.

The price of products that we are bringing to market is slowly also becoming a problem. Our firms are no longer "cheap." In a number of instances, they are more expensive than the competition. Foreign partners frequently only shake their heads: You have lower-priced raw materials and materials resources, cheaper energy and manpower, and you are unable to produce a cheaper product—how so? Then they find out what means of production we use and they stop being surprised. But the proposal to eliminate or specifically limit import duties for key technologies failed to pass.

Another perception that resonates frequently from the mouths of foreign partners during the negotiations with the Association for Industry and Transportation is worthy of consideration. You have highly capable people in "top management," you have able technicians and workers, but in between there is middle management... and it is better not to speak of it.

It is precisely this old wound that, it would seem, will persist for some time. "New" problems include the rate of sick leave. In this regard, we are in first place in Europe. Sickness does not differentiate, but if the sick-leave rate in enterprises amounts to 25 percent, doubts must necessarily arise as to whether the designation as a patient really applies to all those who are absent.

Despite all of this, however, our industry as a whole is beginning to gradually get its second wind. Perhaps at a slower pace and with more effort than it could and should, but there continue to be more than enough difficulties with which it must gradually deal. A solution of a substantial portion of these difficulties lies in the hands of the firms themselves, and has to do with their capabilities, experiences, and initiatives. But they cannot do it all themselves. To repeatedly encounter the same evils is no good to anyone or anything. This is true even more so because the current problems will be joined by new ones as a matter of law.

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Foreign Minister Defends Treaty With Hungary

LD2012144295 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Today's agenda of the Slovak parliament session includes the ratification of the basic treaty with Hungary. Our stringer Renata Havranova reports from Bratislava.

[Correspondent] The dispute concerning this important document began in Slovakia immediately after Prime Ministers Meciar and Horn signed the treaty in Paris on 19 March of this year.

It was not only the coalition Slovak National Party, but also some deputies from the Association of Workers of Slovakia, who expressed their unanimous disapproval of the treaty. However, disputes also exist within the [ruling] Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], whose nationalist-orientated faction issued a statement describing the Hungarian-Slovak treaty as an unlawful and catastrophic document, making it possible for other country to interfere with the state's integrity and sovereignty. These deputies regard the inclusion [in the treaty] of the Council of Europe's recommendation on national minorities as the greatest danger. They claim that even prior to Slovakia ratifying the treaty, the Hungarian side has already been implementing it by putting into effect its expansionist anti-Slovak policies.

Some HZDS deputies feel that the possibility that the treaty could be ratified is tantamount to threat, to ridiculing the law and to a denial of common sense.

[Slovak] Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk rejected these views when explaining the treaty. He emphasized that the document guaranteed common borders and that in no case it enabled that collective rights of the Hungarian minority be recognized. He said that mistrust prevailed in relations between the two countries and that, in the interest of the whole of Europe, it was high time to begin building genuine and correct relations. He said that, to this end, the ratification of the treaty would provide the best chance.

The treaty on good-neighbourliness, friendship, and co-operation with Hungary is an important stabilization factor and a concrete move towards the Slovak Republic's integration into the euro-atlantic structures, Schenk said.

Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is not taking part in the debate, even though the opposition has asked him to do so.

In the debate so far, HZDS deputies have been calling for the ratification to be adjourned. They have been calling on the Hungarian Republic to apologize for all the wrongs committed in the past before the treaty is ratified.

Schenk Optimistic About Treaty

LD2012202295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Slovak parliament spent almost seven hours of its 12th session, held in Bratislava today, discussing a proposal for ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty. Jarmila Tosecka and Michal Tvaruzek now report from parliament:

[Begin recording] [Tvaruzek] [Passage omitted] The debate concerning the treaty has been suspended. [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] We asked Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk whether he considers the outcome of today's debate a failure.

[Schenk] First of all, I really do not think that the outcome of today's deliberations is a bad result. However, I would consider it a bad result if we did vote on the treaty and the treaty was not ratified.

Second, we now have to sort out a few things. This new debate will provide adequate space and a fresh starting point for those deputies who still fear possible misinterpretations or misunderstandings of the treaty, and this should enable them to give it their wholehearted support.

It has been suggested that parliament should outline its interpretation of the problematic, or allegedly problematic, passages of the treaty in some kind of resolution or statement, and I think that such an effective measure would ease the passage of the treaty through parliament. The statement should be prepared by March, along the same schedule as that followed by the government, and it should be binding for the parliament in the legislative area and for the government in the executive area. They both should be bound by it to implement the treaty in a clearly defined way.

I do not think there is anything dramatic about today's developments. After all, a similar situation exists in the Hungarian parliament, where the debate of the treaty has been suspended for three weeks. Really, in this matter we are no different from any other parliament.

[Tosecka] You know that Slovakia is being watched very closely. What kind of foreign response do you expect? Particularly from the Hungarian side?

[Schenk] Let's face it, there could be all sorts of reaction. I am not a sage, but I believe that external reaction will indicate an interest in the successful completion of

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the ratification process. Should expressions of this sincere interest be accompanied by some hidden messages, then we have to try and see what the underlying motives are. [end recording]

Commentary Views Anti-Treaty Dissent in HZDS

AU1912180995 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Dec 95 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Has the Sawing Away of the Head of Slovak Diplomacy's Chair Begun?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] That Juraj Schenk occupied the foreign minister's seat a year ago as a temporary candidate was clear to everyone aware of the behind-the-scenes rivalry within the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] over this lucrative post. At that time, V. Meciar again performed one of his famous tricks, when he left out of the game some of the candidates to whom he had promised this seat, and placed in it a sociology professor and his adviser, although he is not a member of the HZDS. As a safety valve, however, he adjoined to him a relatively experienced diplomat from the old era, Jozef Sestak, who was to be responsible for changing the department's structure, personnel issues, and improving Slovakia's image, including organizing the prime minister's high-profile trips abroad.

But the year has come and gone, and the one-year minister has ended up in a seat that, in the meantime, has turned into a catapult. This is almost not his fault, because the tasks marked out for him were beyond his scope and are rather hidden within the unfathomed twists and turns of the minds of the protagonists of the not very transparent Slovak policy.

The first major signal that J. Schenk cannot be sure of his post was the announcement from the Slovak National Party [SNS] that he is the original source of the problems surrounding the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty, whose ratification this year is unrealistic. At the same time, it is brighter than the sun that he has become the sacrificial lamb for someone else, because the prime minister — as he himself has said — has assumed full political responsibility for its signing in March.

Now, however, under pressure from the hawks — not so much from the SNS as from within his own movement — he has had to begin to maneuver so that his remaining in office is not endangered, because the resistance to the document below which the signature of Vladimir Meciar shimmers, and for which the world applauded him and Gyula Horn, has taken on unexpected dimensions. According to well-informed sources, even the hard nationalist-oriented wing of the HZDS has, apparently, threatened its until now omnipotent chairman that, in the event of his stubborn insistence on the treaty's ratification, they will quit the movement's ranks. And, obviously, this wing is strong enough that the government's majority would be at risk. As is typical in politics in such a situation, since the top brass cannot be threatened, a replacement lightning rod has to be found as a sacrifice for the supposed failure.

This, however, will not resolve the problem of the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. The prime minister is only gaining time so that he can again set in motion one of his famous behind-the-scenes maneuvers with an as yet unclear finale.

However, if he wants to promote this document next year, he does not have many options. That is, if he were to back down now, he would send a possibly unintentional signal of his own weakness to the hawks within the HZDS, and thus would also increase their role and influence on formulating not only foreign, but also domestic policy. And this is not a good omen for him.

The question of who should replace Juraj Schenk remains, however. Although there are several candidates, it is rumored that it will be Jozef Sestak. Whether he will be more successful than his current boss, only time will tell. The coordinates on the Slovak political scene are extremely unreadable at the moment and, thus, also risky. For Jozef Sestak, too.

Pro-Meciar Weekly Criticizes Slavonia Troops

AU2012134395 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 18 Dec 95 p 6

[Commentary by Miroslav Svicky in the "Monitor" column — reprinted from Bratislava ZMENA in Slovak No. 313]

[FBIS Translated Text] I remember that what surprised me most during my visit to the Slovak villages in Croatian Slavonia was the fact that, in the Yugoslav war, Slovaks from Croatian Slavonia had to fight against Slovaks from Serbian Vojvodina. Until then I thought that Slovaks had fought against Slovaks only in the Slovak National Uprising. I was leaving the destroyed Osijek with the feeling that, on top of other bestialities (I find it hard to use the word bestialities, because beasts, unlike people, do not wage wars and kill only for food), FOREIGN [captalization as published] forces were committing yet another one — a fratricidal struggle, even if such cases may be relatively rare. This feeling did not abandon me even when the former federal center in Prague decided to send a few Slovaks to the Balkans, under the command of UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force]. The Prague center, too, was one of a large number of foreign forces.

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Today I am forced to change my opinion, however, even though I do not consider myself a weathervane. Today it is the government of a sovereign state (!) that is sending Slovak soldiers, albeit "only" sappers, to the countries of the southern Slavs (but also southern Slovaks!) under the command of NATO.

Not a few observers, especially from eastern and central Europe, are of the opinion that one of the reasons of the protracted Balkan war, which is dragging on like the nasal mucus of contagious flu, is support for the conflict from some Western financial institutions. The more destructive this war is, and the more it exhausts the southern Slav nations, the more freely these institutions will be able to move about the Balkans. Even if this theory were only 10 percent true, the participation of our soldiers in this sordidness, under NATO's command, should provide food for thought.

Russia Offers Aid for Iranian Nuclear Project

AU2112124095 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Dec 95 pp 1, 6

[Report by Ivan Drabek: "Moscow Proposes That We Earn Money for Mochovce in Iran"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian minister of atomic energy, proposed on Saturday [16 December] to Slovak Minister of Economy Jan Ducky, who was in Moscow on a two-day working visit, cooperation on the construction of nuclear projects in third countries, specifically in Iran and, in the longer term, in Cuba.

The ministers also assessed the mechanisms of implementing the agreement on Russian participation in the completion of the first two units of the Mochovce nuclear power plant (JEMO), concluded during Prime Minister Meciar's visit to Moscow in late October.

The ministers eliminated some misunderstandings concerning the interpretation of the above agreement. According to Minister Ducky, Viktor Mikhaylov pledged that, in the course of next year, the Russian side will haul away spent nuclear fuel from Jaslovske Bohunice.

The ministers also discussed the methods of financing JEMO's completion. As is known, in the October agreement there is talk about a Russian $150 million credit. As transpired from Viktor Mikhaylov's words, however, payments for Russian supplies of $70 million worth of nuclear fuel and for work carried out [in Mochovce] by the Russian side will not be covered by means of a credit, but through redemption of the more than $1 billion debt to Slovakia that the Russian Federation inherited from the USSR. "There will not be any cash. We will deliver nuclear fuel free of charge and will carry out work free of charge. We will be reimbursed by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and the Russian debt to Slovakia will be reduced in this way," Viktor Mikhaylov told PRAVDA.

The minister of atomic energy of the Russian Federation voiced the conviction that the first JEMO unit would be launched within 18 months. "We will take out loans to complete the other units and will be jointly earning money to pay them back," Viktor Mikhaylov said. He specifically proposed that Slovakia take part in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran. According to his words, the Slovak Republic could gain up to $20 million annually for supplies of boiler room and other equipment for the Iranian nuclear power plant. Viktor Mikhaylov expressed the hope that an agreement on Slovak participation will be signed as early as the first half of 1996.

"From my point of view, cooperation with Slovak partners on the projects in Iran and Cuba is even more important than the construction of one unit in Mochovce," Viktor Mikhaylov stressed. Reacting to the objection that the project is exceptionally sensitive politically and that the United States is irritated by it, the Russian minister said that he rejects claims that Iran supports terrorism and wants to produce nuclear weapons. "As for relations between the United States and Russia on this issue, we will clarify them ourselves. This need not bother you," Viktor Mikhaylov stressed.

Asked by PRAVDA whether any third party has already joined the Russian-Iranian project, the Russian minister admitted that: "Maybe Slovakia will join. If not, we will build it ourselves," he declared, and added emotionally: "Who can stop us? The Americans? Who are they, in fact? They have existed for just 250 years, while Russia, in 1988, marked the 1,000th anniversary of the adoption of Christianity."

While in Moscow, Jan Ducky also held talks with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations on the possibilities of further liberalizing trade between the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation and signed a protocol on the progress of work on concluding a free trade agreement.

Minister Ducky also held talks with Rem Vyachirev, director general of the GAZPROM gas concern, on three-year contracts for Russian natural gas deliveries to the Slovak Republic and on the transit of Russian gas to the West across our territory. The two representatives signed a document, on the basis of which a joint venture will be set up, still before the end of this year, for the construction of new (incremental) gas pipelines. According to the minister, the joint gas venture will deal with the construction of new pipelines and with

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trade in gas and other commodities (barter for consumer goods from the Slovak Republic). Asked by PRAVDA whether, within the framework of the planned joint gas venture [spolocny plynarensky dom], the Russian side was interested in a share in the already operating five gas pipeline sections, Jan Ducky replied that his position was unequivocal: "That which has been built in Slovakia and paid from Slovak resources is taboo. Only additional gas conveyance or other capacities are open to discussion." According to Minister Ducky, the Russian side accepted this approach.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 18 December on pages 1 and 7 carries a 700-word report by Blazej Pan[illegible] on Economic Minister Jan Ducky's talks in Moscow. According to the report, "Minister Ducky confirmed to NARODNA OBRODA that Vladimir Meciar's cabinet is contemplating the participation by some Slovak companies in the huge Russian-Iranian contract. This would concern Slovenske Elektrarne [Slovak Power Plants], SES Tlmace, and the Research Institute of Nuclear Energy. Asked by NARODNA OBRODA why Russia wanted to let competitors from Slovakia join the Iranian contract when all deliveries could be realized by Russian manufacturers, Minister Mikhaylov replied: 'You hopefully do not think that Slovakia is a competitor for Russia.... Cooperation is always important.'"]

Spokesman Views Russian Offer

AU2112130095 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Dec 95 pp 1-2

[Report by Martin Benko: "Nothing Coming from Russia Can Surprise Us"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—The offer advanced by Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian minister of atomic energy, to Slovak Minister of Economy Jan Ducky that Slovak companies, along with Russian firms, participate in the delivery of equipment for the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran and, possibly, also in Cuba is a serious one and came rather unexpectedly, Jozef Sucha, press secretary at the Slovak Ministry of Economy, said in an interview for PRAVDA yesterday. The Russian proposal is so interesting and important for us that, according to the press secretary, Minister Jan Ducky will probably inform government members about it at one of the next cabinet meetings. [passage omitted] According to Jozef Sucha, after his return from his two-day working visit to Moscow, Minister Ducky did not comment on Viktor Mikhaylov's proposal in any way. He said only that there is nothing to be added to it and that no proposal coming from Russia can surprise us.

Asked whether possible Slovak participation in the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran was the subject of Jan Ducky's official talks during his visit to Iran in September, Jozef Sucha answered in the negative. He did not rule out, however, that it may have been discussed in the unofficial part of the talks. At any rate, the Russian offer must be considered very carefully, according to Sucha, because, owing to the negative U.S. attitude toward the Iranian nuclear program, this is a sensitive political problem. Slovakia's participation in this project would be possible only if it did not have political side effects. Jozef Sucha conceded that the date of the parliamentary elections in Russia may have been a reason for the Russian proposal having been put forward precisely at this time.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 20 December on page 2 carries a 350-word report by Nora Sliskova on the 19 December cabinet meeting, which includes the following passage: "The cabinet discussed, among other things, Economic Minister Jan Ducky's information on his visit to the Russian Federation. Government Spokeswoman L. Bulakova did not confirm to us that, at its meeting yesterday, the cabinet discussed also the Russian side's offer to cooperate in the construction of nuclear energy projects in Iran and, possibly, Cuba."]

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Reaction to Russian NATO Views Delayed

AU2012163695 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 20 Dec 95 p 4

[Report by "g.j.a.": "We Will Not React to the Russian Statements for the Moment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Matyas Eorsi, chairman of Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, visited the Hungarian IFOR [Implementation Force] base [on 19 December] together with Imre Mecs, chairman of Parliament's Defense Committee, and Lt. General Bela Biro, deputy commander of the Hungarian army. While in Taszar, Eorsi answered our questions in connection with the Russian elections.

"The statements that were made in connection with NATO following the Russian communists' election victory are not new. We have grown accustomed to the Russian politicians trying to outdo each other in creating an anti-NATO atmosphere. In my view, the Moscow leadership has now gone too far. Therefore, a situation similar to that on Germany's reunification might arise in that the decision will be made without involving those who are protesting too loud against it," Eorsi began his answer.

According to Eorsi, if Russia wants to keep its bargaining position, then it should know how far it can go and what it can say, and anyway, it can only be decided after the presidential elections whether NATO is expanded together with or without Russia. Mecs added: "The flurry in connection with NATO is still a domestic political issue in Russia and it has not yet had—and hopefully will not have—a foreign political aspect. I imagine that the Hungarian parliament will not react for the time being to the hysterical Russian statements. We will wait for the outcome of the presidential elections and once the waves of Russian domestic policy are calmed down, we can start to analyze and assess Russia's foreign policy."

Socialists Defeat Government Budget Proposal

LD2012151595 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 20 Dec

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Late on 19 December, the parliament voted on the amendments to the bill on the 1996 budget. It is believed that one of the most important factors of the entire legislation surrounding the 1996 budget was the vote on a seemingly innocent amendment. However, in the actual ballot, the government's proposal was defeated, despite the fact that prior to the vote the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] group of parliamentary deputies assured the government of its support.

[Correspondent] The background to the story is that the 1995 budget had envisaged a 150 billion-forint [Ft] privatization revenue, but by late autumn this year, it became clear that the revenue might increase to as much as Ft250 billion before the end of the 1995-96 financial year. Therefore, the government included an amendment to the draft 1996 budget concerning this 250 billion. The government intended to use this sum to reduce the state debt.

An amendment linked to this amendment was submitted by two deputies, Gyula Gaal [deputy of the junior coalition party Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ] and Laszlo Keller [HSP]. The Gaal-Keller amendment proposed that any privatization revenue—even that over and above the 250 billion—should be used exclusively to repay state debts. Experts believe that the extra privatization revenue might reach Ft100 billion.

Had the parliament rejected the Gaal-Keller amendment, the Horn government would have had much more room to maneuver next year, to the extent of some 10 percent of the budget. Not surprisingly, at last night's emergency session of the HSP group of deputies, Prime Minister Gyula Horn emphatically asked the group to vote against the amendment. We interviewed the prime minister before the vote.

[Horn] [Passage omitted] All indicators signal that the effects of the stabilization and privatization measures and other steps are beginning to show. What I would describe as a problem still is the fact that, regretfully, even in 1996 we will have to continue the economic and financial stabilization program but, hopefully, the early achievements of this improving situation will be felt by the population, too, as early as in 1996 and beyond.

[Correspondent] However, surprisingly, only 105 deputies voted against, so even among the members of the 209-strong HSP group of deputies only half voted in support of Gyula Horn. Two hundred and six, that is all the opposition parties and the SZDSZ—and, of course, dozens of HSP deputies—voted for the Gaal-Keller amendment which ruled out the expansion of the prime minister and the government's room to maneuver.

Szabo on MDF's Internal Trends, Prospects

AU1912110195 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 16 Dec 95 p 7

[Interview with Ivan Szabo, head of the MDF parliamentary group, by Gabriel Toth Oszy; place and date not given: "Civil Alliance Is the Only Alternative"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Oszy] In recent months, the public seems to have noticed two

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marked trends within the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. One of them supports the Civic Alliance, while the other supports the four-party national cooperation. This equal division can be clearly seen in the decisions of the National Board, where the members voted 50-50 on expulsions and alliance issues, as if we were watching a fight between populist national and national liberal forces, while the Christian Democrats are being forced into the background.

[Szabo] This only seems so but, actually, in addition to the two marked trends, there is a strong movement effort in the MDF. From the very beginning, this trend has been represented by Sandor Lezsak. We are talking here about the so-called popular left wing, a trend that follows the third way ideas of the movement of people's writers in the 1930's. The main trend, which Sandor Lezsak has also joined, is the modern European Christian democracy, one that is formulated in our statute, and Lajos Fur is the clear representative of this trend. In every speech, Fur stresses the party's number of values consisting of national commitment, Christian responsibility, and national liberalism. The statute of the German CDU [Christain Democratic Union] indicates the same. This Christian Democratic line is the one represented by Lajos Fur, the National Committee, and most members of the National Board. This is the strongest trend within the MDF today. A totally different political line is represented by Gyorgy Schamschula and Peter Balaton. This sees a scope in Torgyan's National Alliance, and wants to lure the MDF members there.

[Oszy] Do you openly support the Christian Democratic trend?

[Szabo] With all my influence and spirit, I support the current chairman and his policy, which clearly excludes any cooperation with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] or the Allinace of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]; at the same time, it also means that, with the exception of local cooperation, we cannot sign any election or government cooperation with Torgyan. Lajos Fur wants to advance in the middle, between the two walls. We hope that the "clean wing" of the Christian Democrats will once gain the upper hand and will become our allies, and cooperation with the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] will also be suitable to keep the original three-party alliance alive. In my opinion, the Civic Alliance is the only alternative and I say, that without this, a socialist-dominated government will prevail in Hungary after 1998.

[Oszy] I understand from your words that you are also urging the convention of a national meeting to put an end to the internal debate once and for all.

[Szabo] We must finally decide which trend is the domninant one and the others should accept this decision. If they are unable to follow the victorious trend, they should give up political activity within the MDF in the period between personnel changes. This is the only way to preserve party unity. It is impossible simultaneously to go to the right and to the left and, meantime, remain in the middle.

[Oszy] Many people regard the disintegration of the Civic Alliance, which you also supported, as a failure of the MDF's alliance policy.

[Szabo] It is not the failure of the MDF that this alliance failed to materialize; we missed the opportunity for the opposition forces to seize power. Naturally, it is also the failure of the MDF in the sense that, this way, we will find it more difficult to come to power.

[Oszy] The question is whether these parties will make it into parliament at the next elections. According to a recent survey, 3 percent would vote for the MDF, and 5 percent would vote for each of the FIDESZ and the KDNP.

[Szabo] I am not aware of this. It is true, however, that the latest Gallup survey shows 3.5 to 4 percent. However, this figure is misleading, because more than half of the people in the survey did not even answer the questions or said that they would not even vote. The National Assembly cannot work with half a house, so these figures must be multiplied by two. This means that the three parties together would get 27 percent of the votes: FIDESZ, 7 percent, and the MDF and the KDNP, 10 percent each. However, I must point out that, for the same period, the Marketing Research Institute predicted 8 percent for the MDF, and the Szonda Ipsos predicted 11 percent for us. In other words, all three parties would make it into parliament.

[Oszy] I do not think, however, that these figures calm you down....

[Szabo] If we cooperate with the other two parties, this could be a very marked force in parliament. I would remind the readers that the KDNP did not reject the idea of a preelection alliance. So, the situation is far from being as desperate as many people would like to see it. [passage omitted]

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'Sudden Halt' in Economic Growth Reported

AU19?2091595 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 18 Dec 95 p 11

[Correspondent's report: "Central Statistical Office Report on Economic Performance in the First Nine Months of 1995—Growth Has Come to a Sudden Halt"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest data of the Central Statistical Office show that economic growth slowed down or even came to a sudden halt especially in the second half of 1995. At the same time, some economic sectors registered growth.

Industrial production is not one of them, because it increased by 8.3 percent in the first six months of 1995, compared to the same period of 1994, but it only increased by 4 percent in the last quarter. Thus, industrial production increased by an average of 6.8 percent in the first nine months of 1995. Exports increased considerably, by 21 percent, but the pace of increase decreased every quarter.

Investments reached levels similar to the one prevailing in the same period in 1994, but investments in the building industry dropped considerably, while housing construction exceeded the value of the first nine months in 1994 by 12 percent. Agricultural procurement increased by 17 percent compared with the same period last year. The number of cattle was similar to that in 1994, but the number of pigs increased by 7 percent.

Retail trade turnover dropped by 7 percent compared with the first nine months of 1994. The nine-month foreign trade deficit exceeded $2.5 billion, but this deficit was smaller than the one prevailing at the same time in 1994. The gross average salary of full-time employees increased by 17.6 percent; however, taking into consideration the consumer prices, the result is that the net real wages dropped by 11.5 percent.

Economic units employing more than 50 people in Budapest produced 680 billion forints [Ft] worth of goods in the first nine months of 1995. Some 70 percent of industrial products were sold domestically. The processing industry increased production by almost 1.5 percent, and in the meantime, it sold domestically as much as it did in 1994, and exported 4.4 percent more than in 1994.

Production increased by a little more than 2 percent, and all this along with a 9 percent drop in the number of employees. This also means that production per employee increased by 12 percent, compared with last year.

As opposed to accelerated demand last year, demand for construction work dropped in Budapest this year: Construction and installation work worth Ft57 billion in the first nine months of this year represents an 18 percent drop compared with the first nine months of 1994. At the same time, investments continued to increase in Budapest: firms employing more than 10 persons spent Ft250 billion for this purpose, a 25 percent increase compared with 1994. Investments made by ventures increased by 42 percent, but investments made by budget-financed firms decreased by 27 percent.

Industrial producer prices increased by 28 percent, compared with 10 percent last year. Consumer prices increased by 28 percent, as opposed to only 18 percent in the same period last year. Household energy prices increased by 46 percent in the first nine months of 1995, food prices increased by 34 percent, and the prices of other products increased by 19-26 percent on the average.

The number of economic units increased considerably: the Central Statistical Office recorded 341,000 economic organizations in Budapest in September. There were 277,000 noncorporate ventures, 80 percent of them were individual ventures. At the same time, many entrepreneurs returned their licenses in recent months as a result of the changes in economic regulations.

The average gross wages of intellectual workers approached Ft58,000, and that of manual workers approached Ft34,000.

Extra Privatization Income To Reduce State Debt

AU2012174695 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Dec 95 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "Privatization Incomes: The Government Was Defeated"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Among the amendment motions submitted to the budget law, the National Assembly voted 206 for, 105 against, and 13 abstentions in favor of the motion submitted by Gyula Gaal and Laszlo Keller, whose essence is that part of the privatization income—namely, the additional income—has to be spent on reducing the state debt. The chairman of the Hungarian National Bank and the finance minister will agree on the ways to do this.

From the voting list on the proposal submitted by the deputies in connection with the further use of privatization incomes, it is clear that the opposition parties and the Free Democrats almost unitedly supported it against the government.

The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] parliamentary group's division is shown by the fact that 60 deputies, including Laszlo Bekesi, Judit Csehak, Judit Csiha, and Ivan Vitanyi, voted against the government.

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Some 102 Socialist deputies, two Free Democrat ministers—[Education Minister] Gabor Fodor and [Deputy Coalition Prime Minister] Gabor Kuncze—and Janos Latorcai of the Christian Democratic People's Party supported the government's stance and voted no.

According to NEPSZABADSAG's information, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] deputies voted in favor of the motion because, in their view, it is not possible to leave many hundreds of billions of forints deficit in the budget, and no alternative suggestion existed for a rational use of the additional privatization income.

According to MSZP parliamentary group leader Imre Szekeres, nothing surprising happened at the voting for the budget amendment motions because the views formed in the parliamentary group were expressed, 90 percent of which coincided with the government's stance. In the case of the 10 percent that was debated, the issue had been discussed with the government in advance. Szekeres said that the final outcome was only uncertain in the case of voting for the use of privatization incomes, but this could not cause a surprise either because a very sharp debate had also been held on this in the parliamentary group. Therefore, the outcome of the voting depended on the SZDSZ and the opposition, rather than the MSZP. Finally, Szekeres emphasized that he stood up after the voting for the budget amendments with satisfaction because such a great agreement has never been seen between the government and the coalition parties in the case of a difficult budget like this. [passage omitted]

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Izetbegovic Confirms Full Cooperation With IFOR

AU2012205695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received news that the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Commander General Rasim Delic, and government Minister Hasan Muratovic today received Admiral Leighton-Smith, NATO commander for the implementation of the peace agreement in our country.

The talks focused on the deployment of the Implementation Force [IFOR] in Bosnia-Herzegovina pursuant to the Dayton agreement. IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina has many tasks before it in the next year; they are a great challenge for all members of the international forces, who are approaching them with great enthusiasm, Admiral Leighton-Smith said.

President Izetbegovic confirmed the readiness of civilian and military authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for full cooperation with IFOR, and wished them luck and success in their work. The talks confirmed the mutual readiness for a successful implementation of the Dayton agreement.

French General Janvier on IFOR Deployment

BR2012143995 Paris LE FIGARO in French 20 Dec 95 p 5

[Report by Arnaud de la Grange: "Bosnia — United Nations Hands Over to NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb — The offensive was massive and brutal. "General Winter" launched his crack divisions on the assault on Bosnia. The signing of the peace agreement apparently left him cold. Snow and fog are seriously hampering the deployment of the NATO forces, especially the 20,000 U.S. troops who are due to move in to Tuzla in central Bosnia.

The climatic ambush has not, however, jeopardized the transfer of authority from the United Nations to NATO, which is due to go ahead today. General Bernard Janvier, head of the Blue Helmet forces in the former Yugoslavia, confidently informed LE FIGARO: "The command structures are more or less in place. On the ground it is the units already deployed under the UN flag that will start to apply the plan."

Fighting Talk

As the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] is wound up, NATO's implementation force [IFOR] of 60,000 men starts to move into position. A "simple and scaled down" transfer of authority ceremony is due to take place in Sarajevo this morning. General Janvier will transfer the responsibility for command to U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith. However, General Janvier will still be around, as he will immediately take over as deputy to his successor. He will also take on the additional role of commander of the UN forces deployed in eastern Slavonia and Macedonia and those that are not fully joining the NATO force. They must depart before 31 January 1996, when UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia come to a definitive end.

Keeping the current head of the Blue Helmets in the new command structure is a guarantee that UNPROFOR experience will be put to good use by the IFOR, or at least if the new arrivals are flexible and receptive. General Janvier stressed: "Despite the difficulties and failures, it has been the United Nations' commitment that made the current solution possible." The UN forces moreover paid a high price with over 200 dead, including 56 French troops.

At the operational level, precautions have been taken to ensure that the handover is not exploited by possible warmongers. Asked about the risk of things going wrong in Sarajevo, General Janvier reassured: "We have decided not to immediately disband the multinational brigade which is the main deterrent force in Sarajevo." This French-British unit was set up in the framework of the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] last summer. Its guns hammered home the message of the NATO air raids.

Strict Rules

The rules of engagement for any alliance troops having to use force will be very strict. Bill Clinton warned: "We will meet fire with fire." So will the IFOR be the UNPROFOR with a big stick? General Janvier said: "That is something of a caricature. UNPROFOR saw a significant change in its rules of engagement, especially since the RRF was established." The fighting talk of IFOR should not therefore be that different from that required by the French in the summer of '95.

One colonel wondered, however, how the U.S. authorities would react when the first GI was killed in Bosnia. In order to minimize the risks and losses, Washington has used its usual tactic of going in armed to the teeth. Heavy M1 Abrams tanks will churn up the difficult Bosnian roads. The same colonel concluded: "The U.S. troops and their massive logistics would form a convoy 350 kilometers long."

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Commentary Warns IFOR Against Pale Serb 'Games'

AU2112085095 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 18 Dec 95 p 5

[Commentary by Mario Marusic: "Post-Dayton Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina really over with the Dayton agreement and the signing ceremony in Paris? Or, as some are already saying, has it just been put off for a year or two?

U.S. interests in the pre-election period have proven decisive (again), unlike in 1991 or 1992, when the United States gave the wink to the Serbian aggressor's savage bombardment of Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Mostar, Sarajevo, and other cities. However, at the very beginning of the implementation of the Dayton accord on the ground, the question inevitably arises as to how deep the United States is prepared to sink into the Bosnian mud, that is, what and how effective a means of (military) coercion is it ready to use, and for how long (will one year be sufficient to eliminate all the seeds of hatred and war?) is it ready to endeavor to bring to their senses those — and it is obvious that it will be the Bosnian Serbs again — who will obstruct the implementation of the peace agreement?

In all this, one of the key questions, and perhaps even the decisive one, is the puzzle of Sarajevo, which was solved in Dayton, Ohio against the Serbs' desires. Not even in their worst nightmares could Karadzic and his herd have dreamt that Sarajevo would be a unified city again and under Croatian-Bosnian Federation authority! Some of them even fainted in Dayton when they saw the maps of the Serb Republic without their Serb Sarajevo. Nevertheless, what followed after the first shock obviously indicates that the KKK (Karadzic, Koljevic, and Krajisnik) came around quite quickly, launching various initiatives, including the customary Serb referendum, whose only goal was to delay the implementation of the Dayton accord.

After all, Karadzic does not even try to hide his intentions. After the referendum produced the result that it did, as was known in advance, he declared a cessation of war on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, but said that this did not apply to the region around Sarajevo, only to insist on Pale television shortly afterward, trying to calm down the Serbs who are leaving Serb Sarajevo in ever increasing numbers, that the peace agreement, placing the entire city under the authority of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, would not be implemented immediately. According to Karadzic, if in a year or two a decision on departure is still on the agenda, the Serbs will not need to separate, because they will have been settled in a new city. The construction of such a city will be subsidized by the FRY, which, according to Aleksandar Buha, foreign minister of the Bosnian Serbs, has given them a written guarantee that it will provide the funds, while even the international community is ready to devote certain funds to such a project, again according to Buha.

It is clear even to a layman where all this is leading: to a postponement of the implementation of some parts of the peace agreement on Sarajevo by several months or even a year, so as to give them time to build a new city.

Of course, to these most recent Serb Games Without Borders [comical television game show] Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic immediately reacted by saying that there could not be any postponement of the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement, particularly not with regard to the unified Sarajevo, while even earlier, on several occasions, Croatian officials had also expressed full support for the implementation of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Even President Clinton himself has pointed out that there cannot be any postponements or changes to the Dayton treaty or the subsequent Paris peace accord. This is because in that case a domino effect could occur, and the entire thing could easily slide back to the beginning. Therefore, it remains to be seen how U.S. officials will react to these recent cunning attempts by the Pale leadership, that is, whether IFOR [Implementation Force] will make it clear to everybody in the first hours of the peace playoff, and particularly to Karadzic and his herd on the Sarajevo question, that they can definitely forget about any new games to buy time, which could easily turn a fragile peace into a continuation of the Serb aggression within a few short months.

Despite the undoubtedly warning tone of the U.S. President and the commander of the allied forces, the international community has still been dragged into yet another Serb game over Sarajevo. The question is whether it will have the strength (not only military force, but also principles) to keep to the path of a just peace and stop caring about the Sarajevo Serbs too much, as at the same time it is not showing the least interest in the continued ethnic cleansing of Croats and Muslims from Banja Luka.

"No person or organization is trying to stop the removal of the Banja Luka Croats and Muslims. They are being left to the mercy of the Serb authorities that are harassing and persecuting them on a daily basis," an

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anonymous UN official in Sarajevo maintains, confirming that at the moment all eyes are on the Serbs in Sarajevo. We can only hope that IFOR does not intend to build a KK[illegible] city for them and thereby become the builder of a Serb Sarajevo, instead of carrying out its designated role, which is that of a builder of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and rather that it will eventually move Karadzic and his followers into a new city all right — The Hague.

Commentary: IFOR Wants To Make Good Impression

AU2012142095 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 19 Dec 95

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Republic is expecting the arrival of the major part of IFOR [Implementation Force]. There are fewer and fewer unknown details regarding their deployment along the separation lines as provided for in the Dayton agreement. What is already visible is the fact that new peacekeepers want to make a good impression on their hosts and use every opportunity to meet with representatives of Serb Republic authorities.

Silajdzic on IMF Membership, UN Role, Aid

LD2112001195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We should remember today for the three big events that we have been talking about. Time will tell whether we will remember these events in the future. We will round up this part of the news with the question of what membership of the International Monetary Fund, the arrival of IFOR [Implementation Force], and the conference in Brussels means for Bosnia-Herzegovina. We put the question to the prime minister, Haris Silajdzic.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] The membership of the IMF opens the door for us the international financial world. How to use that chance?

[Silajdzic] It is happy news for all of us. I have just talked to the [Bosnia-Herzegovina National Bank] Governor Omirovic, and he told me that we have been accepted into the International Monetary Fund, and from today we are members of the IMF. So all our efforts have borne fruit. Congratulations to all of us, because as you have just said, it means Bosnia-Herzegovina's grand entry into not only the world of monetary institutions, but also into the entire world economic system. It is an initial impetus, it is up to us to work from now on as we have been working up until now. That is, to enable our economy to become a modern European economy in the true sense of the word.

[Correspondent] Membership also implies obligations. Can we fulfill them, or will we wait for others [words indistinct]?

[Silajdzic] The international community in general is not lenient, especially when debts are concerned, but Bosnia-Herzegovina is a special case. After these steps, we face negotiations with the international community, in particular the Paris Club and the London Club. This is where most of our debt is, a debt of $2.9 billion. We must settle the question of debts to be able to embark on the economic-financial reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the reintegration into the international mainstream.

[Correspondent] The second important event today was the departure of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and the arrival of IFOR. What is [words indistinct]?

[Silajdzic] Well, UNPROFOR is the United Nations. The United Nations made a mistake in its approach to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a world issue. The United Nations here played the part of the Red Cross taking a neutral position between the victim and the aggressor. To be neutral between the victim and the agressor means, in practice, to be on the side of the aggressor. It was a mistake in approach, in the very premise itself, the United Nations took the wrong step. That was the root of the mistaken mandate, the many mistakes in high-level policy of the United Nations, with regard to the UNPROFOR troops, the men on the ground. Some of them lost their lives in order to help Bosnia-Herzegovina and we value this. bHowever, the United Nations's plan, as far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, was wrong.

IFOR, of course,is something else. We hope that IFOR will have a different mandate, in accordance with Dayton and that it will act promptly, decisively and in response to the situation.

[Correspondent] The third important event today was the Brussels donors' conference, which is to work out the dynamics of reconstruction, priorities, [words indistinct] money.

[Silajdzic] I will be frank. From what I hear on the plans of certain countries; it is below our expectations. We could have, to a large extent, expected this. This problem did not end with the signatures in Paris. The international community, especially the relevant international factors, should continue to treat this problem very seriously. The international donors' conference, according to what I have heard, does not match our expectations. Or rather, what we know that countries will pledge does not meet our expectations. We are doing

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all we can to improve the situation. We have received praise — why not say it — from the World Bank, the European Union, from the U.S. Treasury from the International Monetary Fund — that in what we have done so far in the conditions in which we are living, we have achieved more than expected. So, we can expect something. We must continue to work. Of course, we need the help of the international community. That is why we are doing everything we can for this donors' conference in Brussels, an initial conference, to achieve as much as possible success. The major pledging conference will be held in February of next year. It is very important what we achieve now in Brussels is very important — these are initial pledges for the reconstruction of Bosnia. [end recording]

Forum Discusses Problems in Aid to Bosnia, FRY

LD2012232795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2313 GMT 20 Dec 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Dec 20 (TANJUG) - The first conference of donor countries and organizations to help the reconstruction of war-ravaged economies of countries of the Former Yugoslavia opened in Brussels on Wednesday, clouded by unresolved dilemmas as to how and with which funds and whom to help in the international community drive led by the European Union and the World Bank.

Although this was formally an expert-level preparatory meeting designed to secure a starting sum of about half a billion dollars to kick off the program of aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it appeared that the conference has served to raise a series of question that would not be easy to supply the anwers to.

Although this was a closed-door meeting, much could be learned already on the first night at briefings from the participants themselves and at informal news conferences.

Sarajevo Muslim Government Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic described the offered sum of 5 billion dollars for a four-year period reconstruction plan for the countries of Former Yugoslavia as ridiculously small, and urged that his government alone get it.

The E.U. itself, that is, the European Commission, was at a loss to whom and how to extend aid. There were two concepts of assistance. One, as urged by high representative for implementation of peace in the Former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt under which the region as a whole should be assisted with Bosnia enjoying priority and the other, urged by European Union Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek under which aid should go to the Muslim Sarajevo government alone.

The latter, at least according to the statements so far, was also backed by Washington.

Zubak Urges Accelerated Federation Revitalization

AU2012172895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Dec 95

[Report by Jasenko Krehic on the Constituent Assembly session in Sarajevo on 20 Dec — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krehic] The session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina began with problems regarding the agenda. Ivan Bender, head of the Croatian people's deputy caucus, proposed that Point 6 — the federal budget — be taken off the agenda. Bender justified the proposal by saying that not a single Croatian deputy received the necessary material. Bender was followed by Enver Kreso, head of the Bosniak people's deputy caucus, who said that he understood Bender's reasons and asked for clarification from the Finance Ministry.

Following several speeches either for or against including the item on the agenda, Enver Kreso said there were not enough elements for a debate, and the Bosniak people's deputies decided that the budget should be dropped from the agenda [words indistinct]. After the agenda was adopted, Federation President Kresimir Zubak spoke about the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in Paris. He said that no section of the Dayton agreement had been changed in Paris, and nothing had been disputed.

[Zubak] No talks were held on the agreement itself, and neither the agreement or any of the annexes were called into question. Therefore, we did not discuss the issues that were last discussed at the Constituent Assembly session, that is, the maps, or concretely, eastern Bosnia and Bosnian Posavina.

[Krehic] For the revitalization of the Federation to take place as soon as possible, Zubak proposed that the constitution be coordinated with decisions reached in Dayton which would prevent problems from burdening the Federation. The government's institutions must continue functioning as they have so far, until they are gradually abolished. Some authority has to be deferred to the republican government, so that it can retain its legal continuity. Federation President Zubak addressed another issue:

[Zubak] Third, we have to appoint federal representatives to bodies in charge of implementing the agreement, starting with the joint interim commission, pursuant to

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the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution's transitional provisions, that is, the Dayton Constitution, a joint military commission as specified by Annex 1, military missions and commissions from Annex 1b, the commission for demarcation from Annex 2, temporary and permanent electoral commissions as specified by Annex 3, arbitration as specified by Article 5 of the human rights commission from Annex 6, the commission for displaced persons and refugees from Annex 7, the commission for public corporations from Annex 9, to the joint consultative commission from Annex 10 of the framework agreement.

[Krehic] The Federation president proposed that the Dayton negotiating team, expanded to accommodate Professor Ganic, should nominate candidates which will represent Bosnia-Herzegovina in all of these commissions. They will also monitor the implementation of provisions for the revitalization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

Opposition Parties' Joint Stance on Accord

AU2012205795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Opposition political parties and their representatives in the assembly have coordinated stances regarding the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here are the stances:

1. We insist on the consistent and timely realization of all tasks and activities pertaining to the implementation of the international agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the aforementioned agreement was signed by representatives of the state and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we believe that the only legitimate incumbents for the implementation of the agreement should be relevant state bodies and parliamentary political factors. That is why we request that the assembly should organize all mechanisms and control instruments within the assembly's working groups. We propose the establishment of a special assembly group that would monitor and oversee the implementation of the peace agreement comprising representatives of all parliamentary parties.

Esteemed chairman, in accordance with the Constituent Assembly's rules of procedure, we ask you to submit this proposal for review by the assembly.

2. The forces of war have been defeated by the international peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The arrival of true peace to the region will exclusively depend on the consistent implementation specified by the peace project, and no one has the right to put personal or party interests before the peace project and thus call into question its implementation.

3. One of the most crucial issues regarding the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an internationally recognized state, and the establishment of lasting peace in the region is the consistent implementation of the agreement on the revitalization of the Federation. Opposition parties will intensify their international relations in order to [word indistinct] responsibility of all state and political factors responsible for implementing the international agreement.

The stances were signed by the representatives of the Social Democratic Party, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, Croatian Peasant's Party, and the Republican Party.

Army Said Weeding Out Non-Bosniak Officers

AU2112102495 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 13 Dec 95 p 7

[Article by Djuro Kozar: "Non-Bosniaks Unsuitable?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel Rajko Mihajlovic of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was recently removed from his duty in the Sarajevo Garrison. There would not be anything unusual about that if he were not the last non-Bosniak in the leading structure of the 1st Corps, who has no new post waiting for him. Thus the command of this corps now consists exclusively of Bosniak officers, just like the commands of other corps, except for the 5th Corps.

"I have been in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the beginning of the resistance to the aggression, at one time I was the deputy commander for the morale of the 1st Corps. Now I have suddenly been removed and put at disposal, and that, as it seems, only because I am a Serb," Mihajlovic says.

"I feel cheated. When in the spring of 1992 I applied to the former Territorial Defense of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I was not told that three and a half years later I would be unsuitable because of my ethnicity."

The Essence Is in Mistrust

Mihajlovic graduated from the Military Academy, infantry branch, and he is an experienced officer who, in the opinion of those who know him well, can perform the most complex operational duties. Because of the reduced cadre policy in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he cannot even be the head of the Service for Social Issues, the post from which he was removed, and was taken off duty for an uncertain period of waiting for a possible new post.

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He could experience the destiny of officer Nikola Ivancevic — to be sent to a place that is not commensurate with his education and rank, which he has never accepted. Ivancevic was the deputy commander for morale of the Educational and Recruitment Center of the 1st Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in Sarajevo, from which he was removed, and, "because the duties so required," moved to a place in a logistics unit. All his attempts to get an appropriate post have been useless — as Ivancevic believes, only because he is a Montenegrin. Is that a question of mistrust, or is it something else?

We asked Mihajlovic and Ivancevic if they had talked about this, for example, to the deputy commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Brigadier General Jovan Divjak, and appraised him of their removal from their posts. They say they had, and that Divjak listened to them carefully, and understood them, but that, as they say, this general has very little influence in the General Staff, and no influence whatsoever in the issues of personnel!

And indeed, because of the exclusive orientation of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which insists on the Bosniak cadre, the role of General Divjak has been reduced to "parades." He deals with everything except for the thing he knows best — how to lead a war. In that way, this officer, who was once the teacher of tactics in the military school, now spends most time opening exhibitions, advertising books, talking to children....

Divjak — for Exhibitions

Divjak does not want to comment on his present unenviable position. He says that that is up to the Supreme Command and the commander of the General Staff of the army, General Delic. The only thing that he really misses, as he says, is the possibility to visit the soldiers in the units. After the reorganization of the army, now that divisions have been formed, he has no access to the units any longer. Probably someone who decided on these things thought it was inappropriate for a Serb general to visit the units. Several times we met the soldiers Divjak used to visit, and they, as we could see, had no objections about it.

There was some talk about Divjak retiring or going into diplomacy (like General Stjepan Siber), but formally he is still the deputy of Rasim Delic [Commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army]. And, at that, he is his only deputy, since General Rifat Bilajac and General Ramiz Suvalic, who were also his deputies until recently, have in the meantime retired, or been moved to other duties. Divjak has been left as deputy, in the opinion of some people, only because his departure would have been celebrated by the aggressor side, for which it was hard to bear the fact that in some negotiations the "Muslim side" (as they say) was lead by a Serb.

When he was once asked about the possibility of retiring, General Divjak answered that, if nothing else, it would be illogical for somebody's active military service to be stopped while the war was still going on. He also added: "If someone ordered me to retire now, I would stay in the army — as a soldier, a volunteer."

Only the command of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is still multinational. Reportedly, what counts most with General Dudakovic [Commander of the 5th Corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] is — professionalism. On one occasion, he said that the members of the command of the corps and the brigade commanders must be graduates of the military academy, and he added: "If I have to wait to explain tactics to a layman, I would lose the battle!"

Different Practice in Bihac [subhead]

The third man in the hierarchy of the 5th Corps is a Serb, Aleksandar Mrenica, and in the command [of the 5th Corps] there is another officer of the Serb ethnicity — Drago Ilic. In that command, there is also one Slovene — Vladimir Vincar. Until recently, there were two Croats in the command of this corps as well — Ivan Prsa and Franjo Grgic, who, upon the request of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] of Bihac, were then sent there. Now, Brigadier Prsa is the commander of the HVO garrison in the Bihac region, in the place of the missing Vlado Santic. Therefore it is logical that the 5th Corps and the HVO will cooperate in that part of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the commands of the divisions, brigades, and battalions of Dudakovic's corps, there are many Croats and Serbs, just like the members of other ethnic groups. The reason for that is probably the fact that the commanders of the former Regional Staff of the Territorial Defense of Bihac, Hajrudin Osmanagic (now the assistant of the military attache in the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina in Ljubljana) and Ramiz Drekovic, who was the first commander of the 5th Corps, in the first days of the resistance to the aggression opened the door to all the patriots, regardless of the nation they belonged to, as well as to the officers who had left the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] and expressed their readiness to defend the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although many of them were not born here. Thus, it happened that Bosnia- Herzegovina has been defended by the Slovene Vincar, and that the Bosniak Mahmut Skadrak, who is in the United States now, fled.

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Refugee Situation in Prijedor Discussed

AU2112093995 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Dec 95 p 9

[Report by B. Radic: "Brothers in Need"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prijedor's population did not celebrate the signing of the peace treaty for Bosnia-Herzegovina in Paris with shooting, as was the case when the agreement was signed in Dayton in November. Now that they have learned somewhat more about its provisions, Prijedor's inhabitants say that there were not many reasons to have been shooting in November. They are especially dissatisfied with the part that relates to the return of refugees to their homes.

The region's [Serb] population tried hard to be populated by just one nation, and it has to be admitted that this was very successful, so it now has difficulties accepting that it will have to share it with other nations. It is some consolation for the majority of Prijedor's population that no Muslims or Croats who were expelled from here, and there are a great many of them, will probably even dream of returning. If they do decide to take this step, some Serbs have announced that they will leave the region, whereas more radical Serbs claim that they will openly resist their return.

The Dayton peace agreement appeared when Prijedor's supporters of an ethnically clean area were putting the finishing touches to their project. But a considerable number of Prijedor's inhabitants now claim to have the feeling that the war was waged in vain.

Villagers Move to Towns

Although the area is almost ethnically clean, there are also Serbs in Prijedor who live alongside members of other nations and do not consider this a punishment or a defeat. It is true that they are only a minority and it is forbidden to talk about coexistence with other nations and insisting on it is often dangerous for one's personal safety.

Even if there were no resistance to the return of the non-Serb refugees, there would be another problem: where to accommodate them. The villages and some suburbs where they used to live have been largely devastated. New occupants have moved into those houses that have remained undamaged. During the past three and a half years, there has been genuine looting of abandoned houses and apartments, and it is a open secret that some of Prijedor's inhabitants have more possessions now than before. Army members, the disabled, and families of fallen soldiers who have still not solved their housing problems have protested to the municipal authorities on several occasions, as nothing has been done about this despite all the promises. Many have made use of the war to move from neighboring villages into the town and their relatives or parents take care of their old houses. Therefore, it is no surprise that there are not enough apartments here, although more have moved out than in.

Serb refugees live in many of these houses. According to official data, 25,000 refugees are accommodated in the municipality of Prijedor. The moment war broke out in former Yugoslavia, they started arriving from Slovenia and Croatia, then central Bosnia, western Slavonia, the Knin Krajina, and, after the joint offensive of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council, also western Bosnia. About 3,600 of them are accommodated in private centers, whereas others live with their relatives and friends and many have found accommodation without official help.

Contemptuous Profiteers

Together with the refugees also came war profiteers, and it seems that they have mostly harmed the refugees, because of their contemptuous behavior and throwing money about. The refugees who had to flee, leaving everything behind, are now all at the same level and, whenever a refugee complains about his miserable life, a large number of Prijedor inhabitants, who have also fought for their survival, respond by asking, "What do you want? You live better than we do."

It is therefore no secret that there is a rift opening up between the original population and the newly arrived, which has already developed into mutual distrust. It is felt everywhere, so it has proven impossible to implement the government plan to accommodate refugees with Prijedor families. There were no public complaints, but almost every inhabitant of Prijedor found a plausible excuse for refusing to take in a refugee.

If an opinion poll were made, it is estimated that a sizable number of Prijedor's inhabitants would support the strict implementation of the signed peace treaty, that is the return of the Serb refugees accommodated in their region to where they came from.

Official Denies Muslim Mass Graves in Srebrenica

LD2012180295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1505 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Dec (TANJUG) — On several occasions in August, American and other foreign correspondents visited the sites where mass graves of Muslims are allegedly situated in the area of Srebrenica and they found nothing, Miroslav Deronjic, the civilian commissioner for the Srebrenica-Skeleni municipality, has said.

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Deronjic attaches to a written statement, the text of which TANJUG obtained in Belgrade, copies of the permits issued by the International Press Center of the Bosnian Serb Republic, which show the names, surnames, passport numbers, and nationality of members of the American CBS and British BBC TV crews who were in Srebrenica at the end of August.

Responding to allegations in certain Western circles that the Serbs committed large-scale atrocities during the liberation of Srebrenica, Deronjic cited the example of 25 August 1995, when he received a group of 10 correspondents, journalists from the United States, Great Britain, and Austria, lead by Mark Wallace, which brought with them "photographs taken from an AWACS of alleged mass graves of Muslim victims."

"They insisted that we should take them to the sites in the photographs so that they could assess for themselves the truth of the Muslim allegations. Without hesitation, in other words immediately, although I had not previously seen the photographs, I agreed to take them personally to every place in which they were interested. They showed me photographs in the region of Hrncici, K. Polje [as received] and Kasaba, and asked to be taken to these places. I got into the car with Wallace and immediately took the whole group to these locations.

I spent 44 hours with them driving around the area, and allowed them to see for themselves whether the alleged mass graves existed, allowing them to move around freely and to investigate the whole area. I also expressed a willingness to take them to other places, if they had information of large Muslim graves there. Throughout the time in the area, the correspondents recorded statements from local people, civilians, officials, and passers-by, in other words they had complete freedom to carry out their work.

After the investigation, Mark Wallace personally thanked me and expressed his belief that the allegations were completely unfounded, and that the entire international public had been manipulated. He promised that he would put his view objectively in the world media, Deronjic says in his statement.

These and other correspondents who visited Srebrenica and its vicinity before and after the CBS correspondents informed the public that they did not find any mass graves, or that the Serbs were victims of Muslim-perpetrated crimes in the villages of Kravice, Bjelovac, Fakovici, Skelani, and other villages in the areas that abound in mass graves — of Serbs. The exhumation of Serb victims from the mass graves in the region of Srebrenica was also witnessed by French General Morillon himself and other international officials, Deronjic's statement says.

The Serb civilian commissioner says that many Muslims were killed in infighting and conflicts between forces which were in favor of surrendering, and those that urged further resistance. This is best corroborated by statements made by Muslim soldiers for Muslim TV, condemning commanders Zulfo Tursun, Ejub Golic, and Nezir Mandzic of being merciless toward those units which wanted to surrender, Deronjic says.

An anti-Serb media campaign in which untrue allegations were launched regarding crimes in Srebrenica has been in progress ever since Serb troops entered Srebrenica, although there is a document signed by UNPROFOR and the Muslim side, confirming that the withdrawal of the Muslim Army and civilians took place in line with an agreement.

Deronjic also sent to the masterminds of the campaign a distressing photo of a mother kissing her son's skull found in one of the huge mass graves of the Serb population in Fahovici in May 1993.

"Perhaps it will be the distressing nature of this photo that will contribute to discovering the truth about the Serb people in the municipality of Srebrenica and Bratunac, about which the world has so far been silent," the statement says in conclusion.

Chemical Weapons Facility Reported Near Mostar

96BA0055A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Nov 95 p 11

[Article by Natali Garic, London: "Serbia Is Making Lethal Sarin"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] On Monday the British TV network ITV revealed yet another shocking discovery: The former Yugoslavia was manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, and Serbia has that capability even today. Serbia has a program for manufacturing chemical weapons, which signifies a threat to the entire region, judging by evidence found by a British military official. Three weeks ago Major David Craig found traces of chemicals for the nerve gas sarin in a closed factory in Potoci near Mostar. Sarin is the lethal nerve gas that had horrible consequences this year when it was released in the subway in Tokyo. Major Craig, who was one of the advisors for chemical weapons during the Gulf War, found traces of sarin in samples taken from that factory. The samples were then analyzed by Swedish experts, who confirmed that sarin has been made in Potoci.

The television program "World in Action" broadcast conversations with former workers at that factory. Judging from what they said, Serbian soldiers disassembled the equipment in the factory three months before the

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war began in Bosnia in April 1992. The workers also say that sarin and mustard gas are being produced somewhere in Serbia.

Major Craig confirms this: "I likewise believe that sarin, toxic sulfur gas, and probably some other poisonous gases are being produced in the factories at Lucani and Barici." The major added that although he does not have proof, the Bosnian Serbs used sarin in Bosnia, and there is evidence that they have been using the psychotropic drug knows as BZ (Bonactyzine). The Yugoslav program for manufacturing chemical weapons was also associated with Iraq in connection with the creation of the Orkan M-87 rocket launcher, which the rebel Serbs later used when they fired missiles on Zagreb from the "krajina."

Stipe Mesic described on the program how when he was president of Yugoslavia he made a secret trip to the United States to inform the Pentagon about Yugoslav cooperation with Saddam Hussein. Mesic said that he delivered to the Pentagon an entire dossier about the chemical arsenal.

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'Secret' Agreement With FRY on Prevlaka Denied

LD2012195995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the interview with Dr. Zvonimir Separovic, published in PANORAMA on 20 December under the heading "Secret Deals on Prevlaka and the Succession of the SFRY," which abounds in unfounded assertions, and in order to inform the public of the truth, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia announces:

"The Dayton agreement in its original and only version was presented during the debate in the Croatian parliament and is available to the Croatian public. The agreement, initialled in Dayton and signed in Paris, does not and never has contained any secret chapters that contain clauses on Prevlaka or the succession of the SFRY.

"Both the president of the Republic of Croatia and the minister of foreign affairs clearly state who initiated the negotiations on Prevlaka, how they proceeded, and how they were concluded. At the instigation of the FRY, Serbia, and Montenegro, there was also discussion in Dayton of Prevlaka, that is, the Ostro Point, but no deal on an exchange of territories was reached nor was an agreement signed. The delegation of the FRY, Serbia, and Montenegro proposed a draft agreement, which the Croatian delegation did not and will not accept.

"The Republic of Croatia is not prepared to exchange territory that encompasses the area of Prevlaka, that is Ostro Point. The security of the town of Dubrovnik has been dramatically boosted by the Dayton agreement, as a part of the Dubrovnik hinterland has been included in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

"There is also nothing secret with regard to the succession of the SFRY. The agreement on normalization was drawn up and signed with the help of international mediators. Croatia has informed the other successor countries of the SFRY and the major world powers of the contents of the agreement and the covering letter that Minister Dr. Mate Granic sent to Minister Milan Milutinovic, containing the Croatian interpretation of certain clauses, specifically Article 4. The subsequent course of events, including the activity in the Security Council and the joint appearance of the four successor countries, removes any doubt with regard to the agreement on normalization. It is well known that the text of the agreement on normalization does not contain a single mention of Prevlaka. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia notes that the Balkan Institute is an entirely private institution and as such could not have taken part in the peace negotiations in Dayton, nor were the heads of the Institute present at all phases of the negotiating process in Dayton, as Dr. Separovic claims in the said interview."

Tudjman Told of U.S. Position on Croatia-FRY

LD2012233995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2329 GMT 20 Dec 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 20 (TANJUG) — U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has sent a message to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman stressing the U.S. position that a normalisation of relations between and mutual recognition of Croatia and Yugoslavia are a must. The message was conveyed by U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Zagreb Robert Fin on Wednesday, according to a statement released in the Croatian capital.

Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic said on Tuesday that Croatia was blocking mutual recognition with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Motenegro) by refusing to honour the Dayton Peace Accord. The same view was voiced by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic on Wednesday.

Bulatovic said that Croatia had agreed in Dayton, Ohio, USA, in late November that the disputed strategic Prevlaka Peninsula on the Adriatic should belong to Yugoslavia, but had now reneged on the agreement. He said that, until Croatia discharged its obligations under the Dayton Accord, it would not be recognised by Yugoslavia.

Tudjman imformed Fin that Zagreb and Belgrade were continuing talks about concrete technical preparations for restoring telecommunications links and other traffic between them, and spoke about the active part played by Belgrade in this.

The U.S. side welcomed these moves, the statement said.

Croatia and Yugoslavia restored telephone lines on Wednesday afternoon.

The statement on the meeting said that the need was stressed for deploying 5,000 troops to Eastern Slavonia, Barania and West Srem (Srem-Barania region, former U.N. sector east) as part of a NATO-led international force to implement the basic agreement for the region.

Serbs in the region, the only one of the original four U.N. Protected Areas that the Croatian Army has not invaded, agreed with the Zagreb regime in mid-November on a peaceful settlement of disputes in the region.

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The agreement, which was formulated with the help of U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter galbraith, envisages for the international administration of the region for a period of at least one year and for its demilitarisation.

Commentary Examines Strength of Peace Accord

AU2112093295 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 16 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Sanja Modric: "The Yellow People Are Yellowing, the Red People Are Travelling"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the presence of the world's biggest big shots — Clinton, Chirac, Kohl, Chernomyrdin, Major, and Gonzalez — the commitments of the Dayton treaty have been ceremonially certified in Paris, while in the luxury of the Elysee Palace Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic have confirmed their guarantees initialed at the Dayton cage by real, official signatures. So now it is peace, so we are supposed to celebrate.

Still, there are many — and particularly in Bosnia, which has been literally savagely dismembered — who will immediately cast a shower of the worst curses on such a peace. And principally, that is quite normal. Any peace is the end of a war that broke out at the crossroads of opposing political projects, overlapping geographic maps, incompatible interests, or of all this together, and if a peace is achieved around a green-covered table, as has been in this case, none of the sides involved can ever be fully satisfied. Each of them has to sacrifice some of its goals declared in its war manifesto, each of them pays for other sides' acceptance of peace, and gets something in return for its own acceptance of peace as well. There can be a fully satisfied side only when war is ended by one side's victory and the other side's defeat (which is not the case in former Yugoslavia), whereas any peace accord involving different solutions inevitably causes disappointment among military staffs of the warring sides, as well as among ordinary people that belong to those sides. In all this warlords that sign diplomatic peace accords are most annoyed by the fact that — precisely because of the nature of their deal — they cannot ride a magnificent horse of victory in an imperial manner. Since they did not win, and they insisted all the time that they would, could, and had to win, what remains to them is to play a different tune, the one telling us about benefits of peace, reconstruction, cooperation, and reconciliation. They prefer this rather than concede that they set themselves abnormal goals, that they are incompetent strategists, that they irresponsibly imposed wrong ideals on their people, and put other people's lives at stake.

As leaderships wage wars by "feeding cannons" on the flesh of the broad masses (rather than their own), and by gambling with the property of the broad masses (rather than their own), the conclusion of peace is, as a rule, a reason for sincere celebrations and precisely by those in whose names wars are apparently always launched and waged, being those same people who get killed on the front, whose villages are devastated, and whose hungry children breathe the horror of uncertain future every day. Particularly if they have already experienced war, the value of peace is unquestionable for ordinary people, and even if that peace is quite obviously not a just one. Peace returns people to their natural state of mind, where crime, suffering, and fear do not rule over their personal lives, and where they can get back to their ordinary, little, human affairs.

Peace Without a Message

But peace usually has another big value for all those who are directly or indirectly concerned. It is found in the formulation of a clear message about what was wrong, exaggerated, thoughtless, careless, irresponsible, inflated, and so forth, in this bloody story which must not ever be repeated, or allowed to happen again.

The peace in the former Yugoslavia is somewhat similar to, and somewhat different from, others. First, what is interesting is that after so much suffering and misery nobody is joyful except, perhaps, those who have found themselves by mere chance in the regions outside the borders of this reportedly finished war. It is only they who have enough strength to think pragmatically: There will be no more killings, we shall have a better standard of living, or who knows what else. Whoever gives a more profound thought to this reversed situation will have to seek an answer to the question: How is it that the entire world is loudly applauding our peace, while the victims here are still as desperate and indifferent as before? And he will see that it is not because people here are not able to swallow the bitterness of necessary concessions, but because the things that politicians call concessions in this peace are something that cannot be demanded from anybody. This reportedly finished war is monstrous because it not only brought about killing, tortures, and destruction, but it also brought about the forceful displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from their homes, who, like bodies of naked snails, were thrown into other people's homes, with poor chances of ever coming back to their native soil again. In order to make such things achievable, various projects and national platforms were concocted, or agreements reached about unparalleled proper and long-lasting solutions. Those who are using managerial terminology to call the results concessions

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have to face contempt and hate shown by the objects of their concoctions.

Croatia Is Holding Its Fingers Crossed in Its Pocket

The second thing in which this peace differs from peace as a general idea is that this peace appears void of any morals — just as in the children's song in which "the yellow people are yellowing, and the red people are travelling." Several days ago in the Croatian Assembly, when the Dayton treaty was being discussed, given full certainty among all the participants that everything had been forced, the SDP [Socialist Democratic Party] insisted, and in our opinion in the most principled way, that Croatia should finally take a clear attitude toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SDP demanded that, given the peace as it is, the Croatian state sincerely get involved in the uncertain struggle for integral and unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it stop doing things on two rails and keeping its fingers crossed in its pocket. In Paris, however, they got quite an unambiguous answer to their demands from our president.

All three statesmen who signed once more the Dayton agreement — Izetbegovic, Milosevic, and Tudjman — addressed the public after the signing. Izetbegovic, of course, spoke about Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pointing out that he is convinced that the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina will know how to find a common language, Milosevic directly referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, even though 20-year-old Serbs from Pale were shouting into the microphone of a CNN reporter that they would not and could not live together with other peoples there. And what did our president say after he signed the peace accord on Bosnia-Herzegovina? After a potpourri of para-historic remarks about the causes of war — at which Kohl immediately took off his translation earphones — Tudjman said the following, and only that: "On its part Croatia will do everything to bring to life the agreements on the Bosniak-Croatian Federation and its friendly cooperation with Croatia." Obviously, not a single word referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Again. And after everything that happened.

The recognition between Croatia and the FRY failed to come, even though it had been announced in Dayton, Ohio. The issue of Previaka is still a lingering threat, and eastern Croatia is still uncertain. People from Bosnian Posavina region are being generously offered resettlement in Grahovo and Glamoc. Pale is screaming. Tudjman is consistent, he is not mentioning Bosnia-Herzegovina. And we are supposed to see each other in peace. How?

Commander of 'Tiger' Brigade Interviewed

96BA0034A Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 6 Nov 95 pp 28-29

[Interview with Staff Brigadier Jozo Milicevic, commander of the 1st Guards Brigade, the Tigers, by Boris Komadina in the Croatia Garrison; date not given: "A Tiger Fighting for Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian Army Staff Brigadier Jozo Milicevic, a 30-year-old with the cheerful smile of a boy, is today commander of what is probably the best-known unit in the Croatian Armed Forces—the 1st Guards Brigade, better known as the Tigers.

Jozo Milicevic, whose appearance and behavior contrast with strict and rigid military discipline, is the personification of the new and modern military commander, combining in himself all the features and peculiarities displayed by the Croatian fighters in the homeland war.

There is not a single military map in his modest office in the Croatia Garrison. Milicevic does not even need one, because in the past five years he and his Tigers have traveled all over Croatia, and there is hardly a village, mountain, or area where he has not been.

Sincere and uncomplicated, Jozo Milicevic relinquishes his smile only when he talks about his fellow fighters who have been killed and wounded.

The homeland war has greatly altered this man, as, in fact, it has all those who came to Croatia's defense in the first days.

And how did it all begin....

"The 1st Guards Brigade actually grew out of the first generation of the new Croatian Police, when on 5 August 1990 the special-purpose unit was created; part of it was stationed in the Zagreb suburb of Rakitje. Aside from regular police work, the unit was at that time also guarding all the more important institutions in the city. In time, the unit grew and began to equip itself for combat missions.

"When it was officially founded, the 1st Brigade had about 700 men in three battalions.

"At that time, the Lucko special unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was the only professionally trained unit in Croatia. It was its members who gave us the name Tigers, because they jokingly said that in the thickets of Rakitje there are tigers who are scaring people. That is why at first we did not like that name, but in time we showed that we actually are tigers.

"Even before our formal establishment, we had several independent actions to restore public peace and order

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and to prevent actions by Serbian extremists. Those actions were carried out in November and December 1990 in Pakrac and Korenica, and in January, March, and April 1991 in Zagreb, then again in Pakrac and the Plitvica Lakes, on the well-known bloody Easter,' when 13 of our members were wounded, and one was killed.

"In addition to those which are well-known, there were many actions which were not well-known—escorting arms convoys, secret training of members of other units, guarding prisoners, etc.

"You must realize that at that time our base in Rakitje was the only safe place for those fleeing from the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], and it was therefore a thorn in its eye.

"In mid-May 1991, General Lucic was notified to establish the 1st Brigade of the National Guard Corps, and he became its first commander."

[Komadina] How do you look on those first days of the 1st Guards Brigade from today's vantage point?

[Milicevic] When I appraise that time and those events now, I could not reply so easily without certain points of departure which are far clearer to me today than they were at that time.

Up to the end of 1991, we had six infantry battalions, one armored unit, and a number of staff units. That, then, would be the equivalent of two guards brigades. Our units were in Erdut, Vukovar, Djeletovci, Ilok, some were in western Slavonia, some in Banija, and a few of us were in the south and at Ljubovo near Gospic. At one point, the 1st Guards Brigade was spread over 23 places in Croatia. Wherever we went, we gave the local people confidence. The only problem was the lack of weapons. People waited for someone to be wounded or to take weapons from some captured enemy.

Audacity, curtness, and decisiveness were the characteristic features of the Tiger. There was never a question of motivation. It was that spirit that carried us along, and we carefully nurture it even today.

The 1st Guards Brigade always had Croats from all regions, and it is no exaggeration to say from all over the globe. I would emphasize as an interesting fact that in 1991 there was no republic in the former Yugoslavia from which we did not have at least one member. We even had some from Serbia.

[Komadina] The military operation of liberating the south of Croatia, in which the Tigers played the main role, was, say the military experts, the first large military offensive operation of the Croatian Army.

[Milicevic] I would not agree with that. I do not agree with the assertion that equates the action in the south and the Tigers, that is, the opinion that the south created the Tigers.

Even before the south, the 1st Guards Brigade had matured as a military unit capable of successfully carrying out all offensive operations. It demonstrated this in western Slavonia. In 1991, a number of villages from Novska in the direction of Okucani were liberated by the 1st Guards Brigade, which at that time had as an adversary the entire Banja Luka Corps of the former JNA.

The western Slavonia theater was also when the brigade became complete for the first time. Before that, we had battalion commanders who did not see one another for a year at a time, much less get to know the men in those battalions.

As for the southern theater, the main feature was the specific sense of invincibility and community, which would be difficult to recreate. It was that which helped us to overcome the extreme complexity and strenuousness of that military operation and carry it out successfully.

I must admit that the terrain was very difficult and exhausted every member of the brigade to the very limit. I can best illustrate this to you by saying that we had only 15 days of rest during the year we were there. The southern theater, then, did not invent the Tigers, but it did confirm the might and glory of the 1st Guards Brigade.

[Komadina] Recently, following the successful actions of the Croatian Army in liberating the occupied areas, the 7th and 4th Guards Brigades have been given attention in the media. One gets the impression that they have taken away the leadership of the 1st Brigade, which was always spoken about as the best-equipped brigade.

[Milicevic] I always say that when we talk about the guards brigades we are actually talking about the most capable and elite brigades of the Croatian Army. This is not to belittle the other units. Whether the 1st, the 2d, the 4th, or the 9th is the best of them is not up to us to decide. However, if you want to evaluate a brigade, then you must evaluate it from its origin up to the present day. As the commander, judging by the respect which I feel for the other guards brigades and their commanders, I cannot say that we are actually the best. But I always say that, because it was the first, the 1st Guards Brigade has gone through everything that could be gone through in this war, and that its continuous wartime and combat career has extended even beyond the top leadership of the Croatian Army. It is not up to us to decide which is the most elite and most capable unit. This is shown by the results, but the objective is the same for all, and the

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holiness, the liberation of the last foot of Croatian land, is the same for everyone.

[Komadina] What is the difference when you compare the 1991 Tigers to those today?

[Milicevic] First, you must realize that some 12,000 or 13,000 people have been members of the 1st Brigade at one time or another. This is an immense turnover of personnel. You must also realize that a great many other units grew out of the 1st Brigade, and they also had a large share in the operations to liberate the occupied areas, and then also there are a large number of commanders and officers who now hold distinguished positions in the Croatian Army.

People often ask me how many men I still have from '90 and '91. First of all, I think it would not have been honest to continue to keep people from those years in the Tigers. They have given too much in this war, and it is natural that they should be promoted in their military careers. I might only mention that 80 percent of the command personnel in the 1st Brigade, that is commissioned and noncommissioned officers, are from that period. Those people, then, make up the backbone of the command personnel.

The soldiers are younger, which is inevitable. The essential thing is that the motivation has not changed, and that was always the most important component of the Tigers. The sense of belonging to the brigade and developing the sense of community have always been exceptionally pron[illegible]nced in the Tigers.

We tried to develop this from the outset, and with God's help we will continue to do so. I think this is one of the main preconditions for the combat development of a unit.

[Komadina] Speaking about the organization of the 1st Brigade today, a comparison is inevitably made to NATO units with a similar purpose.

[Milicevic] If we want to make a comparison, then we might be compared only to NATO, although I personally do not suggest that we need to look to others to any great extent. First of all, our structure, training, size, and finally the purpose of the Army should be based primarily on the national consciousness and military history of Croats. At this moment, we are close to NATO standards, and yet we are not.

But if we compare our combat readiness and what we possess and our war experience, I think we are very close to the professional NATO units.

At this moment, both our weapons and our technical supply cannot be compared to what we had in 1991.

[Komadina] What are the criteria for choosing candidates who want to join the Tigers?

[Milicevic] The criteria that apply to enrollment in the 1st Guards Brigade are the same as for enrollment in all other guards brigades, which means they are prescribed by the Ministry of Defense. Enrollment takes place in our Croatia Garrison in Zagreb.

[Komadina] The Tigers have also been distinguished by people who, because of their deeds in the homeland war, have gone down in the history of the Croatian state, for instance, the late Damir "Raven" Tomljanovic, Generals Lucic and Marekovic, Brigadier Basic, Colonel Medved, and many others.

[Milicevic] First of all, I would say that these are the men who gave the most to the Tigers and who deserve most of the credit for what the Tigers represent today; without any sentimentality, these are our fellow fighters who fell in battle. Without them, there would not be any Tigers.

So far, during these first five years, 346 members of the 1st Brigade have been killed, 12 are recorded missing, and about 1,700 have been wounded.

Look at the names of members of the Tigers who have continued their military careers in other places: Generals Lucic, Marekovic, Gotovina, Korade, and Kapular.

[Komadina] What was the role of the 1st Guards Brigade in the recent operations to liberate the occupied areas?

[Milicevic] Operation "Summer" in the area of Livno and Glamoc began sometime in June. One infantry battalion reinforced with armor and our staff units took part in capturing the Sator mountain range. After that, our fresh unit took the mountain range Staretina, on the right side of Livanjsko Polje. This was an extremely sensitive area. After those strategically important peaks were taken, the preconditions were brought about for further advance in the direction of Glamoc.

In "Flash," the Tigers performed the mission which they had back in late 1991, when the action was halted because of the signing of the Sarajevo Truce.

We crossed the Kricka Brda and dropped down into the area of Vocarica, and then arrived at Okucani by the old highway.

In "Storm," the main thrust of the attack was via Kapela and Saborsko, and then emerged at Plitvica to join the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We did this in a professional fashion. We broke through the enemy's defense on the first line, we dropped down through Kapela to Licka Jasenica, and then to Saborsko and

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Plitvica. We then set out with one thrust toward Slunj and the other to the border of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some of the forces went to Vojnic, Vrginmost, and the intersection of Petrova Gora, which we surrounded. We walked somewhere close to 180 km.

[Komadina] How do you see the 1st Brigade in the future, and what will its role be in peacetime?

[Milicevic] We can view this in the context of the long-term development of the Croatian Army and guards units. The objective is certainly to maintain the continuity of a modern, well-trained, and nationally motivated unit to perform all missions assigned it.

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Crvenkovski: Good Relations With FRY Unavoidable

AU2112073595 Skopje MIC in English 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Macedonian-Greek relations are more intensive and more dynamic, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Stevo Crvenkovski said following yesterday's meeting in Bonn with his Greek colleague Karolos Papoulias.

Crvenkovski said that from this moment on, this process of economic cooperation will be regulated by the logics of the market and that it will not be able to be influenced by politics that much. On his behalf, Papoulias stated that Macedonia is playing a positive role in the present situation in the Balkans. He added that Macedonia's rapprochement to Europe, and the existence of the state in general, is viewed positively by Greece.

In reporting on these talks, the Greek news agency ANA conveyed Papoulias' assessment yesterday that the talks with Crvenkovski were constructive, and that both countries wish for "a second, productive phase of the talks." "Skopje," Papoulias added, "has understood the positive role that Greece can play for its rapprochement with Europe, and the very existence of the Skopje state."

The head of the Macedonian diplomatic corps stated for radio "Deutsche Welle" that there are no serious obstacles to the normalization of the Macedonian-Yugoslav relations.

In answering one of the journalist's questions, Crvenkovski said that the period of commotion in the relations between the Balkan states, following the peace accord, will unavoidably bring a normalization of the relations [between] Skopje-Belgrade. "We believe," Crvenkovski stressed, "that FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] has no reason to obstruct the anticipated diplomatic relations and mutual recognition.

Aliti: PDP May Leave Assembly, Government

AU2012162195 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 20 Dec 95 p 7

[Interview with Abdurahman Aliti, president of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, by Branko Geroski; place and date not given: "Quitting Institutions—Possible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Geroski] Immediately after the signing of the peace agreement on former Yugoslavia in Paris, which does not treat the Albanian question in the Balkans, the news came from Tirana that the Albanian political parties in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] will leave the institutions of the system—the government and Assembly.

[Aliti] If you ask me whether we are unsatisfied because this question was not treated in Paris, my answer is—yes, however, not in connection with the reactions of the political parties here in Macedonia. This reaction is not new. It is just a repetition of a long-standing view that we are not satisfied with some processes in the Republic of Macedonia, particularly in interethnic relations, and that we think that this can be the reason for us to end our participation in the institutions of the system.

This Should Not Be Done

[Geroski] Does this mean that the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] is announcing its decision to leave the institutions?

[Aliti] I am free to state that the whole party structure and our membership at large are aware of such a possibility, because if you show disrespect for the basic determinations of the party, the program, and the individual, then you show disrespect for your own personal dignity, particularly if these views and perceptions respect the interests of the others as well.

[Geroski] A part of the Macedonian political public suspects that there is a secret party plan regarding Macedonia's fate. Are the Albanians in Macedonia also afraid of this?

[Aliti] I personally do not believe that there is such a secret plan. What I am positive of is that stability and peace in this part of the world depend on the stability and peace in the Republic of Macedonia as well. I hope that the European countries and NATO are firmly determined to maintain peace and stability on the territories of former Yugoslavia and in the Balkans, and therefore I do not believe that there is a plan for the destabilization of the relations here, among us.

[Geroski] There is another thesis that says that Milosevic's "peacemaking" is connected with some concessions in his favor, like Serbian influence in Macedonia, but also the freezing of the Kosovo question.

[Aliti] On the contrary, I am almost sure that the question of Kosovo cannot be frozen. It has apparently been postponed, but not removed from the agenda. I hope that this question will become current soon. You are right about the pressure on Serbia's president—it is not so intensive now. I do not reject the idea that there may be some promises or ideas in some people's heads for an alliance between Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, I am sure that this is not at all in the interest of Macedonia and that the majority of the citizens will not accept such an alliance.

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Time To Sober Up

[Geroski] Will the strategy of the Albanian political factor in Macedonia be different in the newly created situation?

[Aliti] If you monitor our determinations astutely and adequately, you must realize that, as far as the PDP is concerned, we have not changed anything. From the outset, we decided to ask for and accomplish the rights of the Albanians within the institutions of the system. With the election results, we demonstrated that the majority of the Albanians in the country have opted for equality. At the time of the elections, we said that we were going to cooperate with those Macedonian political parties whose strategic views coincided with ours, whose political activity is aimed at maintenance of peace and stability in the country. We have not changed this course. Unfortunately, we realized that there is no such wish on the side of the Macedonian political factor. This is the problem. Considering the day-to-day obstructions in solving some concrete questions, we are coming to the conclusion that cooperation does not depend solely on us. In this sense, I was very pleased when the prime minister said that the government doors are open and that everybody can quit the government. This is a new quality in our relations.

[Geroski] Some believe that there is a slowdown in the democratic processes in Macedonia. There is also a thesis that you are unsatisfied with the situation that is being created by this slowdown. What is your opinion about this?

[Aliti] If you examine the situation in the Assembly, I think that every normal observer will come to the conclusion that there is a comfortable situation there. The Assembly members from the Alliance for Macedonia are very comfortable, they are protected from any unpleasant surprises, they are sure in their representatives in the government who are taking care of the global and strategic goals, and therefore they believe that the debates and discussions in the Assembly are unnecessary. There is an absence of opposition and different opinion. When we try to say something in opposition, it is usually ignored completely. They do not even feel it necessary to answer our arguments with counterarguments. They simply follow the following logic: Let them speak for an hour or two, and then we will vote. This is harmful for democracy. I share the opinion of those who think that this is a serious handicap for the development of democratic processes in the Republic of Macedonia.

[Geroski] How can this handicap be overcome?

[Aliti] Apparently there is no way, there is no mechanism that will improve the current relations. The best way is to reach a consensus and to bring about new elections by creating the conditions for all political groups to participate in the elections.

Let Us Show Our Cards

[Geroski] To what extent do the other Albanian parties, particularly the competitive PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians], share your present views regarding the announcement that the day when you will decide to leave the institutions of the system is not far away?

[Geroski] First of all, I must explain that we form our political views on the basis of our own analyses. We do not follow other people's criteria. It does not involve external pressure or a respect for some party that opposes us. It involves an already created awareness that we really do not have anything more to say to our voters and to ourselves, but that by following the path we have chosen, that of dialogue and participation in the institutions of the system, we can reach an agreement on the interests. We were, and still are, aware that we cannot agree on everything with the other coalition partners. They also cannot agree with us on everything. So we said: Let us solve the questions and problems on which we agree at the moment, let us leave open the questions on which we will be able to reach an agreement in due time, and let us forget about the questions on which we will obviously not be able to agree in the near future.

[Geroski] And what happened?

[Aliti] There is no political will for solving the questions on which we mutually agreed.

[Geroski] What will happen if you decide to change your course; if you quit the coalition and the Assembly? What will happen then?

[Aliti] This is a question that we are asking ourselves constantly. To be honest, there is no defined vision on what will happen if we quit. Of course, there are different opinions; various ideas and combinations on which, at this moment, I cannot give a definite answer, because we have not yet built a concrete opinion. If it happens, everybody, and I really mean everybody, must know that it is not happening because we wish it, but as a result of the repulsive attitude of those with whom we believed that we could cooperate. I am not ready to accept that we have contributed to this. Let us all show our cards and see who is guilty.

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Public 'Fed Up' With 'Illegal' Albanian Actions

AU2012091095 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 19 Dec 95 p 3

[Article by I. Stojkoska: "New Provocation from Mala Recica"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tetovo, December. In the library in Mala Recica near Tetovo recently, the "anniversary of the foundation of the nameless University in Albanian" was "pompously" celebrated. In the presence of professors, students, and a small number of parliament members, but in the "noticed" presence of Estref Aliu, minister of culture from the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], the ceremony started with the Albanian anthem, sung by the chorus of the "Kiril Pejcinovic" high school of Tetovo. Tetovo mayor Sakir Aliti, a representative of local management, congratulated all the citizens in the commune and "at large"—the communities of Tetovo, Gostivar, and Debar, for the "celebration" and the "jubilee." The president of the para-university Fadil Sulejmani "rebaptized" Mala Recica into a "university settlement" with pompous statements and "godfatherly" feelings.

The Macedonians in Tetovo, who have lately forgotten about the dramatic events in Mala Recica, are again provoked and revolted, particularly because "eyes are closed" to this anticonstitutional and illegal activity on the territory of Macedonia's state, because another state's anthem is sung, and because an illegal institution, by holding a meeting in only one language, practically 'Albanianizes' a part of Tetovo region.

Such events, which have become frequent in Tetovo lately, add to the concern, not because of the attitude of the direct organizers whose intentions are clear, but because the state bodies tolerate this situation. The citizens are fed up with the double role of the authorities who are obviously comfortably seated in their positions and who put up with illegal actions that are beyond being tolerated. There is a dilemma among the Tetovo population deciding whether the state bodies are deliberately closing their eyes or whether they are pressed or powerless in imposing legal sanctions against such events. How can one otherwise explain the fact that the Ministry of Education cannot "interfere" because the para-university does not fall within that body's competence, while the police explains that all this falls to the sphere of education.

The public is fed up with protocol reports on such illegal meetings. It is entitled to expect appropriate action by the authorities, particularly because the initiator of the so-called Tetovo university, was sentenced in spring to two years and six months of imprisonment, and who, in the meantime while the results of his complaint are awaited, instead of correcting his attitude in conformity with the laws of the Republic of Macedonia, is continuing his illegal activities.

Perhaps this "celebration" is not simply a "university celebration" but something more, particularly considering the statements by some leaders of the ethnic Albanian parties in Macedonia who are in the middle of consultations on whether to participate in parliament or not and whether to withdraw their ministers from the government if certain conditions are not accepted, such as the use of the Albanian language [in parliament] and the legalization of the para-university.

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Oleksy Addresses Nation on 'Dirty Provocation'

LD2012200695 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1900 GMT 20 Dec 95

Address to the nation by Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy from the Polish Council of Ministers Office in Warsaw — live

[FBIS Translated Text] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. During this festive Christmas and New Year atmosphere, I want to share with you information about my government's work this year. I want to speak about the satisfaction that we should share because we are working together for Poland's success. I do not hesitate to use the word success, because the economic results are good, there is public peace, public optimism is growing, the condition of the democratic state is stabilizing, and international respect for Poland's achievements is becoming more and more perceptible. These are just some examples of our common achievements in Poland which give grounds for pride and joy.

Regretfully, yesterday the Polish and world public was informed by the president in office and his attendants that our country's internal security is being threatened. Unofficially, and in the mass media, I myself am being named as the source of the threat. This evening, ladies and gentlemen, in the evening news you have already had a full range of reportage about what I should do, what heavy accusations I am charged with, and how everyone is concerned about this. The moment one veiled report appears on the air, everyone on the political stage takes it as a judgment against me.

I would like to inform you, ladies and gentlemen, that this is a dirty provocation. This concerns much more than just me alone. This concerns Poland. I therefore have to address these issues, as your confidence, ladies and gentlemen, the confidence on behalf of a significant part of the public in the government and in me as prime minister, is a priceless value for me.

Fellow countrymen. People from special services, with the approval of the minister of internal affairs and Lech Walesa, have undertaken an attempt to destabilize the situation in the country three days before the change of the president of Poland. I think that in the longer term, the undermining of public peace and bringing about a disruption, or maybe even dissolving Aleksander Kwasniewski's presidency is at issue.

In an atmosphere of rumors being spread about the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW], I wrote to Minister Andrzej Milczanowski on 7 December, asking him for information about the possible interest of the State Protection Office [UOP] in members of the government. On 8 December, Minister Milczanowski refused in writing to pass this information to the head of government. Taking up the office of chairman of the Council of Ministers in February, I carried out the appropriate vetting of all the candidates for government, including myself, at the MSW. Everyone was cleared by the vetting. There was also no information at the ministry concerning myself.

I understand that if nine months ago there were some doubts about myself, then these would have been presented immediately to the president, who would not have hesitated in preventing my selection for this important state post. Nothing such as this ensued. The alleged documents, perhaps fabricated, are being revealed when Lech Walesa has lost the elections and it is necessary to depart. The Polish special services are acting against the residing chairman of the Council of Ministers. This means that the prime minister of the Polish Government has been bugged, recorded, and perhaps investigated.

For a successive time in recent years, people from the special services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are creating a danger of a political state crisis, for a successive time they are giving service not to the state, but to just one political option. I thus condemn the organizers of this action. I treat this as an imperative threat to the interests of Poland and the Polish state. I am filled with disgust at the fact that in the struggle for power, the camp of Lech Walesa knows no moral or ethical barriers. Such actions are undertaken by people who are sick with hate. Hatred is the greatest threat to democracy. Hysteria and an outbreak of hatred are the reply to the democratic choice of society made in 1993 and confirmed in 1995.

Ladies and gentlemen, today, in the presence of President Lech Walesa, the Council of Ministers heard reports from the ministers of internal affairs and national defense on the threat to state security. The government, after holding a discussion, did not find any basis to the fears that the internal and external security of our state is threatened, and certainly not on the part of myself. This strengthens me in the conviction that I should not give in to blackmail. I do not intend to allow myself to be broken or to depart, or to surrender. This would mean, in a sense, that I would give up my state powers to the special services, their materials, and their methods of action. This would mean something bad for the democratic path we adopted six years ago in Poland.

I have appealed before to the common sense of society. I genuinely belive in it, contrary to many arrogant and aggressive politicians who disdain their own society and treat it with contempt. They have lost their chance. They fight against democracy. I am convinced that

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society sees this clearly. I believe in the wisdom and responsibility of society, which is greater than the responsibility of those politicians who have lost.

A week ago I was informed that if I resigned on 19 December, then there would be no case. Here is my reply: There is no deal, I will not give in to pressures and political blackmail.

The government continues its work for the benefit of Poland. I express the wish that all the circumstances of this matter be promptly clarified by the proper authorites using democratic, constitutional, and legal procedures. I will not hide behind parliamentary immunity, I will accept every sovereign verdict.

In the case of the accusations being rejected — and who can say better than myself how untrue they are and how hurtful they are for me — then those who brought about this situation must be held responsible.

Ladies and gentlemen, despite everything, despite all the regret, the feeling of hurt, the desire to maintain your respect, despite all of this, I wish today with complete sincerity and during the holiday period, the Christmas vigil, the Christmas holiday, and the New Year, to direct to you, as the head of the Polish Government, much warmth and many good wishes. I also wish to apologize to you for those who have, precisely at the time of the Christmas vigil, presented Polish society with such a gift, in the form of such serious accusations, so heavily wrecking the image of Poland and Polish internal peace.

My wish to you all is that happiness and joy come to reside in your homes, and calm, faith, and hope for the future. I hope that we will all be kinder to each other, that this symbolism of Christmas will truly be a symbolism of hope for new and better times. Just as the government has worked this year in order for these better times to ensue for almost everyone in society. I sincerely and warmly wish all the best to all of you. Thank you for your attention.

Interviewed on Allegations

LD2112111295 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0720 GMT 21 Dec 95

[Studio interview with Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy by Malgorzata Slomkowska on 21 December; from the "Signals of the Day" program — live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Slomkowska] Prime Minister, in your address yesterday you said, and I quote: A week ago I was told that if I resigned by 19 December there would be no case. Who told you that, and what was the case?

[Oleksy] This was the case that was published later and sent to the military prosecutor's office, the case that was reported in the nimbus of law-abidingness, of concern about state security and the threat to this security. I was told about it by the president-elect, who had been briefed by Interior Minister Milczanowski, in the presence of Foreign Minister Bartoszewski, about steps undertaken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] in the case. The president-elect informed me about that, and I have a painful memory of this moment, as it signified a very bad situation in which someone was considering playing with documents and information like this.

[Slomkowska] You used various words in your address — this is a dirty provocation, destabilization of the state, a political crisis, and a threat to the reasons of state. But you did not use one term — a coup d'etat. Was it, according to you, an attempted coup d'etat?

[Oleksy] I try to avoid very extreme terms. I heard this term being used not only by people around me, but also by people alarmed by the sharpness of this aggression, appalled by the fact that such methods and argumentation should be used, particularly at such a moment when a democratic transfer of power is about to take place in a democratic state in the middle of Europe. Suddenly, there is this move. Let us tell the people of Poland, the citizens, and radio listeners that the case is neither sudden nor new, as the authors admit themselves. After all, they have been collecting these documents for a long time; there was conviction about their rightness, and this took months not days. So, everyone is bound to ask what happened, what is under threat in the state that right now, three days before the transfer of power, this is happening. Every normal person has to ask this question. I also did that, and then Minister Milczanowski says: Well, should we have done it before the elections, or maybe between the first and second round? These are not questions and they are not answers. Something happened which sent a message to the world that the situation in Poland is not normal, that Poland cannot free itself from [security service] records. This thing has happened before [in 1993, when then Interior Minister Antoni Macierewicz disclosed names of alleged security service collaborators], and there are not too many well-known politicians in Poland today who are not implicated and have no records. My turn has come. This is dramatically painful for me.

[Slomkowska] Prime Minister, why do you say that your turn has come? The official communique only says that the MSW head has informed the military prosecutor's office about a crime posing a threat to the state security and that this crime concerns one of important personalities in Poland.

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[Oleksy] A very strange thing happened then, and it is ridiculous that everyone is talking with pompous seriousness about secrecy and the most important matters concerning the state, and suddenly journalists, the press, and television are reporting whatever they like and reporting specific things, which then can maybe be confirmed somewhere. Let us not make fools of ourselves with this secrecy, and let us say outright that the journalists and the press are writing about me, about the prime minister, and no one should try to deny this. Some people in the Sejm and in other places have even passed sentence, they are even talking about what should be done in connection with the prime minister's guilt, and so on. This is highly abnormal and very sinister. This cannot help to present our good image in the world. This has got to make people abroad ask what is going on in Poland still. This concerns me. I am concerned and angered that such a serious term as a threat to state security has been linked with my humble person. According to newspapers and television, Jozef Oleksy poses a threat to Poland. I am not so powerful as to pose a threat to anything. And this angers me.

[Slomkowska] You were not a KGB agent, you were not a spy?

[Oleksy] If you were not a woman I would hit you in response to that question. Even asking such a question is offensive. If you know someone, if you believe that he is a patriot — and I am a patriot — if you know that I have been working for Poland for quite a long time — I think that even in bad times I worked for Poland — you should not not ask this question. However, I am going to give you the answer, because I know that the Poles are listening to this. I want them to respect me and never to think — and this includes my greatest enemies — that I could have worked for anyone outside Poland. If this were the case, I would have to consider it more important than my life.

[Slomkowska] Prime Minister, what are you going to do to clarify the matter completely? After all, there is a notification of a crime at the military prosecutor's office.

[Oleksy] This is what it is called in legal terms, and it sounds ominous. I do not know what is in the notification. Minister Milczanowski did not even show me a single page of what he had written to the prosecutor. Minister Milczanowski can of course talk about the rules, the code, but Minister Milczanowski is a member of the government that I lead, and for many months I believed in good cooperation and trust. Minister Milczanowski, together with Lech Walesa and others, quietly and surreptitiously sent this notification, as if I was going to escape or destroy something. This conduct and this hiding behind paragraphs of the penal code are awful and disgusting. I have been told nothing; I know nothing about what is in the notification. Everyone is talking about me, everyone keeps talking and rending their garments about the terrible thing that has happened to Poland because of me. Unfortunately, this is how things look. Let this also testify to our political culture and sometimes to our public hypocrisy. Because I do not know what this is all about; I can suspect and I do suspect that documents against the prime minister have been fabricated using state funds. I think that this fact is also going to be discussed at the prosecutor's office. The prosecutor's office is a state body appointed to investigate charges, and I am not going to refuse to cooperate.

[Slomkowska] How are you going to clarify this?

[Oleksy] I am going to answer the questions that will be asked. I do not know what kind of questions, as I do not know what was fabricated and presented to the prosecutor's office.

[Slomkowska] Can you find out?

[Oleksy] I should think I would have the right to do this at one point or another. I will have the right to be told what has been done against me, and what I have been accused of. This is a normal procedure.

[Slomkowska] Thank you, Prime Minister.

Prosecutor's Office To Decide on Investigation

LD2012193795 Warsaw TVP TV First Program Polish 1830 GMT 20 Dec 95

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Prosecutor's Office of the Warsaw Military District will most probably decide this Friday [22 December] whether it will commence an investigation in the case of spying for the Russian Intelligence Service by one of the highest-ranking state officials. A member of the Sejm Commission for the supervision of the special services has confirmed that the accusations relate to Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy. A report on a crime, together with documentation, was yesterday passed to the Prosecutor's Office by Minister of Internal Affairs Andrzej Milczanowski.

Yesterday morning, Minister Milczanowski personnaly spoke on this matter with the head of the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office.

[Begin Colonel Kazimierz Pospiech, spokesman of the Military Prosecutor's Office, recording] Minister Milczanowski presented materials, prepared by the services subordinate to him, from which it transpires that there arises suspicion as to the perpetration of a crime, [word

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indistinct] specified in Chapter 19 of the Penal Code, and thus one of the group of crimes against the fundamental economic and political interests of the state. This category also contains the crime of spying. [end recording]

As we have discovered, the proof presented by Milczanowski relates to the crime of spying referred to in Article 124 of the Penal Code. It carries a punishment of from five years imprisonment to the death penalty. No politician or official would betray to us what sort of documents were presented by Minister Milczanowski. Sources seeking to maintain their anonymity claim that these are written documents, and also audio and video recordings. The Military Prosecutor's Office is examining the documentation supplied by the State Protection Office, and will most probably take a decision on Friday as to the commencement or else refusal to commence an investigation. The Prosecutor's Office may also address the head of the Internal Affairs Ministry with a request for additional material. Prosecutor General Jerzy Jaskiernia intends to familiarize himself with the documents that are currently being examined by the Military Prosecutor's Office, as this is about one of the most important officials of the state.

[Begin Andrzej Cubala, spokesman for the Justice Minister, recording] These people are not subject to the rulings of universal or else military courts. They are only subject to the rulings of the State Tribunal. [end recording]

What people are these?

[Begin Cubala recording] These are the most important people in Poland, starting from the president, through the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, ministers. [end recording]

Yesterday evening, during a meeting at the presidential palace, Minister Milczanowski familiarized the speakers of the Sejm and Senate, who were taking part, and also the chairmen of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Administrative Court, with documents presented to the Military Prosecutor's Office. Today, none of the participants in the meeting wished to speak about its course.

'Unofficial' Sources on Materials Against Oleksy

WS2112121795 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by Jerzy Jachowicz, Pawel Wronski and Dominika Wielowieyska: "The Prime Minister Suspected of Spying for Russia?; What Does the UOP Have on Oleksy?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *As we have learned from unofficial sources, the materials submitted to the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office [NPW] by the interior minister include operational materials gathered by the Office of State Protection [UOP] on Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy's contacts with KGB officers.*

At 10 a.m. on 19 December, Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski and head of the UOP Investigation Division Wiktor Fonfara brought documents on Prime Minister Oleksy to the NPW. Several hundred pages bound in white covers are now resting in the prosecutor's safe. NPW head Ryszard Michalowski was surprised. When Milczanowski scheduled the meeting, he thought he wanted to talk about Ryszard Kuklinski [alleged spy for CIA]. Michalowski was not in office yesterday due to sick leave.

A Description of the Materials — Information From Unofficial Sources

The UOP materials include more than a dozen pictures showing Oleksy in the company of, among other, two Russian intelligence officers (so claims the UOP). There is also a videotape.

According to the UOP, Oleksy maintained contacts with at least two KGB officers over the last five years in Warsaw and Moscow. The UOP documents specify the names of his interlocutors, dates, meeting places, and the telephone numbers Oleksy dialed. We do not know whether there are any tape recordings of his telephone conversations; the summaries of several are included in the submitted materials.

One of the lawyers at NPW claims that "it remains an open question whether these materials could qualify as substantial evidence in court." An NPW officer told us that the UOP had often sent incomplete investigation materials in the past.

From what we learned at the NPW, the UOP received the first reports on Oleksy from the governmental Personal Security Unit [BOR] in 1993, after the incumbent prime minister had taken over the office of Sejm speaker. The BOR officers were disturbed by the fact that the speaker occasionally disappeared from their sight. That is when the UOP began tailing Oleksy. It also investigated into contacts he had before 1993. Our source claims that the UOP discovered Oleksy had been contacting the two KGB officers at least since 1989. [passage omitted]

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Who Else Apart From Oleksy

A politician from the Democratic Left Alliance told us that Walesa had presented the documents to the leaders of his party, "blackmailing" them and demanding that the prime minister and several other members of the cabinet be replaced.

Our interlocutor said that the documents Lech Walesa has were purchased from a retired KGB agent. "These materials cannot do much harm. The videotape shows a KGB officer posted in Warsaw. He talks about contacts he had with various politicians. You cannot sentence anyone for that."

He went on to add: "Once the whole issue is explained, we will institute legal proceedings against all those responsible for destabilizing the country."

Backstage at the Sejm it is rumored that Milczanowski's documents list the names of five politicians from the governing coalition.

Walesa Official on 'Proper' Steps Taken

LD2012214295 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 2000 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Stanislaw Iwanicki, head of the president's chancellery, comments on the prime minister's address to Panorama.

[Begin Iwanicki recording] The fact that Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski has sent a motion to the chief military prosecutor to instigate preparatory proceedings is of great significance in itself. Today, anyone who comments on this motion or who tries to repudiate or belittle it, or to treat it in categories of provocation or as a major plot of the special services or frustrated politicians, gives himself a bad name.

Over 10 days ago the president was officially informed about the Ministry of Internal affairs' findings. It would therefore be inadmissible and worthy of severe punishment, as well as moral and political infamy on the part of the president, if he did not take any action. I do not know of any such legal procedures which absolve silence and inaction.

The proper and objective verification of the submitted documents by independent and apolitical prosecutors and the sovereign court is the only way to find the truth. The president has opted for this way as the only way.

In my opinion he has once again showed courage and prudence. He did not allow any delays in action, and I stress, he rejected any suggestions of actions which would be at variance with the law. [end recording]

Sejm Commission on Secret Services 'Provocation'

LD2012143495 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 1300 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The whole affair is a provocation by the special services, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, head of the Sejm Defense Commission, says. According to Szmajdzinski, the president and the internal affairs minister have become the victims of this provocation.

[Szmajdzinski] I do not rule out that both gentlemen have been mislead by people from the special services. Given this, the organizations's responsibilities should be specified so that leaks without control are not possible. There has to be an oversight committee. This could never have happened by chance, and it could not have been done by somebody from outside the state institutions.

If some documents were sent to the prosecutor's office, then normal proceedings for dealing with secret documents provided by the law should follow. There can be no parallel public discussion caused by controlled leaks. Today's speculation is doubtlessly provocation. A day will come when the names of people involved will be discussed.

Interior Minister: Investigation Not 'Provocation'

LD2012144995 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1320 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 December — Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski has denied that his motion to the chief military prosecutor to launch preparatory proceedings concerning a threat to the security of the state is a provocation.

After leaving the proceedings of the Sejm Commission for Special Services, the internal affairs minister — asked to comment on the statement by the prime minister, who had described the latest developments as a "dirty provocation" — said: "I deny that any provocative or manipulatory activities by the Polish special services, by the MSW [Internal Affairs Ministry], have or could have taken place. I deny this in the most resolute manner," added the minister.

Asked whether Poland's security was threatened at present, Milczanowski replied that "there is no point in putting forward" such questions, which "raise the temperature in a manner of speaking." Milczanowski admitted that he had spoken to [president-elect] Aleksander Kwasniewski, but would not reveal the subject of the discussion.

After the meeting with Minister Milczanowski, the deputies of the Special Services Commission issued a

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statement in which they said that they had heard a report by Milczanowski and asked for meetings with the Sejm speaker and the prime minister.

In the afternoon Speaker Jozef Zych spoke to the deputies for half an hour. Before entering the commission room Zych told journalists he was concerned about the present situation.

Kwasniewski: Polish Security 'Not Threatened'

LD2012185595 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President-Elect Aleksander Kwasniewski has said that Poland's security is not threatened. During a meeting with the inhabitants of Wloclawek, Aleksander Kwasniewski commented on the allegations to the effect that a high state official used to be a KGB collaborator. According to him, all of the allegations should be cleared up as quickly as possible by the institutions that exist for that purpose.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] All the accusations that have been formulated recently obviously have to be examined under the appropriate procedures. Possibilities for this have been created. There are legal possibilities, before the independent courts, and there are possibilities through, for instance, the work of the special parliamentary commission which deals with special services issues.

I do not want to decide today about the quality of the documents that have been handed over. I trust Jozef Oleksy, because I have known him for many years, and I know that the man is ready to dedicate everything to Poland. [applause]

As a man of responsibility I have to bring about a clear explanation, devoid of any doubts whatsoever, of the problem that has been presented. However, ladies and gentlemen, this cannot take place in an atmosphere where one could conclude that, on 19 November, the people wanted to say what they wanted to do through the elections, but since 19 November only the special services or people of the special services have been deciding about what happens in political life. That must not be so. [end recording]

Russian Service Denies Oleksy-KGB Collaboration

LD2012142695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1408 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, December 20 — Russia's Foreign Counterintelligence Service (SVR) denied on Wednesday allegations that Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy cooperated with the KGB.

"Russia's Foreign Counterintelligence Service categorically denies the fact of cooperation between Polish Government Chairman Jozef Oleksy and the Soviet or Russian intelligence service," SVR spokeswoman Tatiana Samolis told Itar-Tass.

"Such statements spread ahead of the inauguration of the legitimately elected president of Poland are a political provocation," she said.

TV Resists 'Pressure' Over Oleksy Affair Coverage

WS2112134495 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by "KNYSZ": "What Went on at TVP on Tuesday Night?; Pressure Over the Telephone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Tuesday night [19 December], as Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski was at the Presidential Palace presenting the documents he had previously submitted to the Military Prosecutor's Office, the phones were ringing off their hooks at Polish Television [TVP].*

As we learned from TVP President Wieslaw Walendziak, the prime minister was planning to address the nation on television at 20:00 before it became known that the president intended to meet with top state officials. However, at approximately 18:00 the Government Press Office cancelled the Oleksy speech. That is more or less when a rumor began spreading in the Sejm that during the meeting scheduled for 21:00 Walesa was to disclose documents incriminating the prime minister.

By evening, the Government Press Office wanted the prime minister to make a live appearance on "Wiadomosci" [main newscast on TVP's first channel], but ultimately backed out of the idea.

A few minutes after 21:00, Malgorzata Zietkiewicz — a reporter from "Panorama" [main newscast on TVP's second channel] — concluded her live report from the Presidential Palace with the words: "Someone is missing at this meeting. I do not dare say who...". Immediately afterwards, Democratic Left Alliance Deputy and National Radio and Television Council Head [KRRiTV] Marek Siwiec called the head of the Television News Agency, Jacek Bochenek. Siwiec is said to have told Bochenek: "What the f... are you doing?! 'Panorama' is taking part in the plot staged by the Belvedere. Oleksy will be deemed a Soviet spy any minute, and you are getting involved in this. We have not reacted so far, but what you are doing right now is the best proof that you think we are fools."

Bochenek instantly notified Walendziak about the telephone call. "I told him not to do anything and to file

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a report on the call he got from Siwiec as quickly as possible," said Walendziak.

Bochenek followed the instructions: A report containing everything Siwiec had said landed on Walendziak's desk yesterday morning. The TVP president intends to submit it to head of KRRiTV Marek Jurek today and ask in what capacity Siwiec called Bochenek.

At approximately the same time — around 21:15 — government spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska called Walendziak. "In the name of the prime minister, she demanded that the TVP program be suspended immediately and the prime minister be shown live," Walendziak says. "I refused, telling her that only the outbreak of war would justify such a decision."

Walesa Asks Defense Minister To Postpone Leaving

LD2012150295 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1332 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Dec — National Defense Minister Zbigniew W. Okonski had been asked by the president to postpone by two days the handing over of his duties to Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak, the deputy minister designated by the prime minister, a Defense Ministry spokesman reported on 20 December.

According to his earlier announcements, Okonski was to leave office on Wednesday at the same time as the other two so-called presidential ministers. He is going to leave together with the outgoing President Lech Walesa on Friday.

On Friday, as the Defense Ministry head bids his farewell to the forces, Okonski will participate in a meeting of the Collegium of Commanders of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic, which is an advisory body to the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army.

The ceremony of Aleksander Kwasniewski taking over as supreme commander of the armed forces has been planned for Saturday. It is to take place in Minsk Mazowiecki [near Warsaw], which is where the 1st Warsaw Fighter Air Regiment, equipped with 12 MiG-29 aircraft, is stationed.

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Editorial Urges 'Special' Relations With U.S.

AU2012173295 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 14 Dec 95 p 1

[Editorial by Bogdan Chirieac: "The United States Has Good Words About Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. reticence toward the changes that have begun in Romania in the first years after the 1989 revolution is quite notorious. For a long time, the convulsions of the Romanian post-revolutionary society made the Americans doubt the sincerity of the pledge of the new power in Bucharest to make a complete break with the communist past. For three years and two embargoes (against Iraq and Yugoslavia), the United States and Europe displayed their exclusive preferences to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which were completely torn away from the Soviet sphere of influence. However, the wall of distrust is now beginning to crack. Politically, an enormous distance separates September 1992—when U.S. Senator Tom Lantos had no problems convincing the U.S. Congress not to grant most-favored-nation [MFN] status to Romania (the only European country still submitted to such treatment at that time)—and the moment of President Ion Iliescu's visit to the White House, in September 1995. Time, reality, and particularly U.S. pragmatism have had their say, and more progress is being made with each new high level meeting. At the recent Brussels meeting between Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the foreign ministers of the 12 candidate states for NATO adherence, Minister Teodor Melescanu was appointed by the U.S. side to talk on behalf of the entire group of Central and East European countries. In his speech at the NATO headquarters, Christopher particularly mentioned Romania by name. The U.S. Congress marked Romania's National Day in words that have never been used before in a European Parliament. Two Republican and two Democrat congressmen presented Romania's contribution in recent years to peace and stability in the world, as well as our country's progress made along the road of democracy and market economy. The U.S. congressmen also recalled that Romania held the chairmanship of the Security Council during the Gulf War and, in that capacity, supported the military intervention and the imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq, despite the fact that this caused billions of dollars in losses to our country. They also mentioned other successes in recent years, such as the reduction of inflation, the record wheat crops thanks to the privatization of the agricultural sector, the opening of the Stock Exchange, and the increase in the share of foreign investors. They referred to the fact that three free and democratic elections—legislative, presidential, and local—took place in Romania in the last six years. They did not forget to mention that Romania was the first East European country that adhered to the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program. President Iliescu's visits to the United States were considered as "clear messages" that Romania is irrevocably committed to a democratic political system and a market economy.

Although the war in the former Yugoslavia is over, meaning that Romania has lost its role as key country in the observation of the embargo imposed by the United Nations against Yugoslavia, the U.S. interest in our country seems not to have abated. On the political plane, at a time when the Council of Europe was raising its requirements for Romania even beyond its own standards, the United States realized that Bucharest's strivings toward democracy and a market economy should be viewed with greater tolerance. While Europe was exaggerating the extremism in Romania, the United States were content to suggest that our country's interests would be better served if a center alliance were in power rather than extremist parties. The much discussed claims of the leaders of the Hungarian minority to territorial autonomy on the basis of ethnic criteria were dismissed out of hand by the U.S. Administration. At the economic level, the bilateral relations have developed at a fast pace, with the trade volume doubling immediately after the Clinton administration granted MFN status to Romania in 1993. Although the MFN clause must be renewed on a yearly basis, for the time being—only after next year's elections in the United States will it be granted to us on a permanent basis—the giants of the U.S. economy have already set up branches in Bucharest.

However, the best Romanian-U.S. relations are in the military sphere. Some 30 percent of the Romanian Army's international relations are being conducted with the United States. Although Romania was among the last partners included in the Mil-to-Mil and IMET programs, the Romanian Army currently heads the Central European platoon, at a time when all the financial resources and the majority of the material resources are provided by the Americans. The Romanian troops were only asked to invest organizational effort, intelligence, and seriousness, a test that they passed with flying colors, thus compensating for the hesitations displayed by the political class. Taken by surprise by the successful conclusion of the Dayton peace talks, the Romanian diplomacy replied with delay to a proposal of logistic support for the U.S. troops, which are going to be deployed in Bosnia. Nevertheless, the subsequent Romanian proposals to use the Timisoara airport and the Constanta harbor, as well as facilities for the rehabilitation of U.S. troops on Romanian territory, were

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received well both at the Pentagon and at the State Department.

Aware of the potential and geostrategic value of our country and pleased with the progress of the Romanian reform, Washington is offering Bucharest the chance for a special relationship, a relationship which can be developed without jeopardizing Romania's EU integration process. As a matter of fact, this integration process was strongly launched in Essen in December last year, only to be slowed down a bit in Cannes, last June, and it will probably be strongly restrained in Madrid, at the end of this week. Therefore, although it is farther away geographically from us, the United States is today closer to Romania than the majority of West European countries, through the opportunities it is offering us. The chance of a special relationship between Romania and the United States means, in the last instance, democracy, prosperity, and security. Ceausescu missed such a chance at the end of the seventies. It would be a tragedy if Romania's Government were to waste a second chance at the end of the 1990's.

CDR Calls For 'Unity' of Democratic Forces

AU2112073295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of the National Council of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] took place in Bucharest, today. At the end of the meeting, CDR President Emil Constantinescu read a communique, which emphasizes that, six years after the bloodiest anticommunist revolution in East Europe, one can note an unprecedented worsening of the population's living standard, against a background of stagnant reform and increased corruption. The communique also points out that the results of the elections in the Russian Federation, which brought the communist and extremist-nationalist parties to the fore, require the unity of the democratic forces in Romania.

The CDR, through the clear and responsible solutions included in its Contract With Romania program, offers the only real alternative to the revival of communism and extremism, a revival caused by the poverty and confusion of the citizens. The CDR, the communique reads, is a relentless opponent to any political and economic formulas that might bring back communism in Romania.

Answering a question from the correspondents, Mr. Emil Constantinescu said that the recent public opinion polls confirm a beneficial trend, namely, the polarization of the political forces in Romania, which, in his opinion, should precede the advent of economic and social stability, our correspondent Daniel Ruse reports.

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Federal

Milutinovic: Parliament Unanimously Endorses Accord

LD2012181395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1454 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Dec (TANJUG) — Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic said that deputies to the Yugoslav Assembly's Chamber of Citizens and Chamber of Republics unanimously endorsed a report on the Dayton agreement at a session today, which was held behind closed doors.

"The assembly unanimously endorsed the address and the report delivered to it. This was the first report. We will continue to discuss this issue, particularly an agreement with NATO, which should be ratified in the assembly," Milutinovic told correspondents in the federal parliament.

He explained that the agreement with NATO was in no way different from the one concluded with the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], saying that the agreement referred to the crossing of troops. Milutinovic added that the agreement was based on a 1946 convention on rights and immunity of UN personnel.

The Yugoslav foreign minister recalled that the Dayton agreement was signed in Paris only six days ago, saying that the assembly was briefed on it in due time.

Milutinovic said that no conditions had been set in Dayton for the lifting of the anti-Yugoslav sanctions.

"The UN Security Council resolution on the suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sets out in very precise terms that the sanctions will be lifted 10 days upon elections [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] are called."

Asked about Prevlaka, he said that it was "a problem that stands on its own, for the practical reason that the Croatian side shows absolutely no respect for agreements we have reached."

"We had a very precise agreement on Prevlaka and the Serb Republic's access to the sea. They made a promise to that effect. They have simply broken that promise," Milutinovic said.

According to him, "an agreement on mutual recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia was initialled in Dayton, including a framework agreement on the triple exchange of territory between Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia — we should therefore get Prevlaka and access to the sea."

"A square meter for square meter exchange was agreed. However, this did not happen, obviously for internal reasons in the Republic of Croatia," Milutinovic said.

Asked what would happen if Croatia continued not to heed the agreement he said nothing would happen.

"We have lived without Prevlaka so far, we will continue to live without it. The Prevlaka issue has not been fully resolved — because it was not turned over to Croatia, but to the United Nations. Anyhow, international players recognized Croatia with the reservation that it should resolve the Prevlaka issue. Therefore, the issue is open and cannot be resolved by force."

Commenting on the issue of the Srem-Baranja region, Milutinovic said that "everything was resolved by the agreement between the Serbs from that region and the Republic of Croatia."

In Milutinovic's words, the agreement on disarmament that was the subject of a recent conference in Bonn will be controlled by the member countries, whereas the method of control and implementation is yet to be discussed.

"The agreement will be in the making for six months. This is nothing new though. Everything is agreed on under the Vienna documents on disarmament signed by the whole of Europe. The Dayton agreement merely sets the proportions, but nothing by way of quantification and implementation. Hence, nothing is definitive, nothing has been set in stone."

Asked about the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, Milutinovic said that "this has nothing to do with sanctions.

"There are very bad interpretations of this among the public. Our place within the United Nations has not been disputed. We have not been kicked out of the United Nations as we remain a member of this world organization," he added.

Milutinovic pointed out that "the problem can be solved in a very simple way if Yugoslavia applies for admittance to the United Nations," but it would "be absurd if a country that was one of the founding members of the United Nations, and not only of that organization but also of the League of Nations, too, asked to be admitted to something it founded.

"This is a very clear and principled matter, and I believe that this approach has prevailed in the international community," Milutinovic said, and added that Yugoslavia had to find a formula that would satisfy all sides.

The federal minister noted that negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank on continuing cooperation

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were in progress and that "this is a usual, albeit rather complex procedure."

Commenting on the question of the continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the head of the Yugoslav diplomatic service said that this was "considerably complex both in practical and political terms, as well as in terms of principles," and that many mistook it for succession.

"Succession is a material problem. It is the distribution of assets belonging to the former state and it must not be confused with continuity. The continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stems from the continuity of Serbian and Montenegrin statehood, because — at the time of the first, second, and third Yugoslavia — Serbia and Montenegro have been lending international and legal continuity to all the others wanting to join Yugoslavia. This is becoming increasingly clear to the international community," he said.

Milutinovic also said that talks have started with Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — FYROM] on mutual recognition, according to the same formula as with Croatia.

"The formula refers to the total continuity of the FRY, which Croatia fully accepted. Macedonia is also accepting it, but with additional requests regarding the recognition of the continuity of the Macedonian state since 1941," he added.

When asked when the European Union can be expected to recognize the FRY, Milutinovic said: "This process is only just beginning. A discussion about it began two, three days ago at the EU council meeting in Barcelona. It is a complicated process. We will most likely have an opportunity in a few months' time to once again discuss the status which the FRY previously held within the European Union," he said.

When asked whether the FRY would allow the presence of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe observers in Kosovo, Milutinovic replied it would be possible "on condition that our country is a member of this organization."

When asked about the abolition of visas for our citizens, Milutinovic replied it was up to each of the states in question.

Assembly Debates Budget, Approves 1995 Revision

AU2012205595 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 20 Dec 95

[Report by Sonja Djuric — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Late this afternoon, the two chambers of the Yugoslav Assembly resumed work in separate sessions. First, the deputies adopted the budget revision for 1995. They agreed to increase this year's budget by 527 million dinars. From this sum, the greatest portion will go for the financing of defense and veterans and disabled welfare.

Jovan Zebic, deputy federal prime minister and federal finance minister, explained the proposal of the 1996 federal budget to the deputies of the Chamber of Citizens. The budget for the coming year should amount to 5.891 billion dinars. The greatest portion of the federal budgetary funds — more than 70 percent — will go for the financing of the Yugoslav Army and the Federal Defense Ministry, Jovan Zebic said. However, Deputy Prime Minister Zebic pointed out to the deputies that this expenditure for the army should not be viewed, as he said, in a relative percentage correlation with the scope of the federation budget, but should be viewed as a part of the total budgetary public expenditure in Yugoslavia. Namely, in the total budget expenditure, the defense funds participate with 28.5 percent and in the statement of accounts of the total public expenditure [bilans ukupne javne potrosnje] with only 14.7 percent.

It was stated at the session that the budgetary income in the coming year would be secured from real sources and that the government expected to accrue greater income from customs duties, especially after the lifting of the sanctions against our country.

After several hours of negotiations, it was also agreed that the two republics would divert 33 percent of their value added tax for the federation. Namely, Serbia had proposed that this sum should be 30 percent, Montenegro 35 percent, while the Federal Government insisted on a 40 percent share. Ultimately, they nevertheless agreed, let me repeat, to separate 33 percent from the value added tax and the excise duties.

The deputies of the Serbian Radical Party abandoned today's joint session of both Yugoslav Assembly chambers at which Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic held an expose about the course and the results of the Dayton talks. Because there was no direct television relay, the deputies of the Serbian Renewal Movement, the Democratic Party, and the Peoples' Party of Montenegro did not attend the session this evening. Radoman Bozovic, speaker of the Chamber of Citizens, told the deputes that the editors-in-chief of the Radio and Television Serbia and Television Montenegro informed the Federal Assembly in a letter that they were not able to facilitate direct relays of the assembly sessions because of the altered programing schedule. Regarding this, Speaker Bozovic emphasized that the session was public and open, pointing out that the progress of the

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session was followed by the representatives of the media. [passage omitted]

Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Jovic Resigns

LD2012141895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1106 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Dec (TANJUG) — Borisav Jovic, federal deputy to the Chamber of Citizens in the Yugoslav Assembly, today gave up his mandate as a deputy to this assembly chamber.

In a statement dispatched to TANJUG, Jovic says that due to "my resignation from the post of deputy" he is no longer chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Citizens.

He also adds that his "recent demotion from his post in the leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia has become a true obstacle to successfully carrying out his duties in the Federal Assembly."

'Blind Eye' Turned to Croat Destruction in Krajina

LD2012164095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1244 GMT 20 Dec 95

[By Davor Lukac]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 20 (TANJUG) — E.U. [European Union] monitors and U.N. observers have sent a number of special reports from Krajina about Croatia's systematic destruction of all housing and agricultural facilities in the territory from which it expelled about 250,000 Serbs in August.

However, these and many previous reports are not receiving adequate treatment or are being ignored in Brussels and New York.

One of these reports, directly accusing Croatia of ethnic cleansing, was sent by European Union monitors (ECMM) in Knin, but its main claims have never reached the international public.

The ECMM said that about 80 percent of facilities in the northern Dalmatia and Lika regions had been destroyed in a wish to prevent the Serb population from returning in near future.

This idea enjoys the full support of top Croatian circles and corresponding decisions were adopted leading to a well-organized and well-conducted operation, which was carried out under the control of authorities by police, army and others, said a special report, which the documentation and information centre Veritas received through their E.U. contacts.

The report said that entire villages had been torched with the help of tank trucks with fuel. This supports the claim that everything was done under the aegis of Croatian authorities.

E.U. monitors have seen fuel from tank trucks with military police escort being poured over the previously looted houses, which were then torched.

The ECMM said that the deliberate, coordinated and ordered instigation by highest authorities could be aimed only at preventing the Krajina Serbs from returning.

The report said that facilities which Croatia might use had been exempt from the destruction, which indicates that the destructions were carried out under the instructions of top Croatian authorities.

Croatia will use these settlements, most of which will probably always remain uninhabited, to get big international funds for restoring areas destroyed in war.

The Croatian independent weekly FERAL TRIBUNE published the photograph of the ghost town of Kistanje, about 20 km southwest of Knin, in which the Serbian Orthodox church is the only undamaged building. 'Kistanje: Nothing To Reconstruct Here,' is the caption beneath the photograph of the town which was populated by more than 3,000 people.

Openly writing about the proportions of looting, the weekly said that a number of newly-opened shops in Imotski were selling 'second-hand' (actually looted) household appliances and furniture.

Out of the 21,744 houses in 389 Krajina settlements, which monitors visited by October 4, 16,857 houses were completely or partially destroyed and the monitors found only 1,431 people among the ruins in this huge area, the report said.

The biggest destructions took place in regions where there were no combat operations, such as in the municipality of Donji Lapac.

U.N. and ECMM officials continue to register all those cases and send reports, but apart from individual reactions and subsequent statements by some (as a rule former) international officials, everything is treated as minor excesses by irresponsible individuals, who are allegedly out of Croatian authorities' control.

The international factors' practice of turning a blind eye is being used by Croatia for carrying out long-term ethnic cleansing — using barbaric methods in order to prevent Serbs from even contemplating return.

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